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A SIMULATOR STUDY OF THE INTERACTION OF PILOT WORKLOAD 
WITH ERRORS, VIGILANCE, AND DECISIONS 
H. P. R u f f e l l  Smith* 
Ames Research Center  
SUMMARY 
This  r e s e a r c h  comprised a f u l l  miss ion  s imula t ion  of a c i v i l  a i r  t r a n s p o r t  
s c e n a r i o  t h a t  had two l e v e l s  of workload. Twenty f u l l y  q u a l i f i e d  three-man 
crews took p a r t  i n  t h e  s tudy .  The a c t i o n s  of t h e  crews and t h e  b a s i c  a i r c r a f t  
parameters  w e r e  observed and h e a r t  rates w e r e  recorded.  
Reduction of t h e s e  d a t a  permi t ted  t h e  enumeration of e r r o r s ,  v i g i l a n c e ,  
d e c i s i o n s ,  and t h e i r  a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h  h e a r t  ra te  t o  be  i n v e s t i g a t e d .  
The r e s u l t s  showed t h a t  t h e  number of e r r o r s  w a s  very  v a r i a b l e  among 
crews bu t  t h e  mean inc reased  i n  t h e  h ighe r  workload case. The i n c r e a s e  i n  
e r r o r s  w a s  no t  r e l a t e d  t o  rise i n  h e a r t  rate b u t  w a s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  v i g i l a n c e  
t i m e s  as w e l l  as t h e  days s i n c e  t h e  l as t  f l i g h t .  
The recorded d a t a  a l s o  made i t  p o s s i b l e  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  d e c i s i o n  t i m e  and 
d e c i s i o n  o rde r .  These a l s o  v a r i e d  among crews and seemed r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
a b i l i t y  of c a p t a i n s  t o  manage t h e  r e sources  a v a i l a b l e  t o  them on t h e  f l i g h t  
deck. 
E r ro r  rates and h e a r t  rates were e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same as those  found i n  
a c t u a l  f l i g h t  o p e r a t i o n s ,  i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  q u a l i t y  of t h e  s imula t ion .  It  is  
suggested t h a t  s i m i l a r  l e v e l s  of f u l l  miss ion  s imula t ion  could b e n e f i t  t r a i n i n g  
and a c c i d e n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  
INTRODUCTION 
I n  1974 t h e  au tho r  made p roposa l s  t o  NASA Ames Research Center  f o r  a f u l l  
miss ion  s imula to r  experiment t o  s tudy  t h e  performance and e r r o r  ra te  of  a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  sample of a i r c rew c u r r e n t l y  o p e r a t i n g  scheduled r o u t e s .  It w a s  
suggested t h a t  performance might be  downgraded dur ing  high workload s i t u a t i o n s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  those  r e l a t e d  t o  abnormal ope ra t ion  o r  equipment malfunct ion.  
The Nat iona l  Research Council  agreed t o  suppor t  t h e  au tho r  f o r  a s tudy  
t o  be c a r r i e d  out  a t  t h e  NASA Ames Research Center ,  and p r e p a r a t i o n s  f o r  a 
t r i a l  of t h i s  n a t u r e  began i n  J u l y  1975. Ear ly  i n  1976 a f u l l  miss ion  simula- 
t i o n  experiment w a s  conducted t h a t  exposed 20 three-man c i v i l  a i r l i n e  crews t o  
low and h igh  workload s i t u a t i o n s .  
changed i n  r e s p e c t  t o  e r r o r s ,  v i g i l a n c e ,  and decisionmaking. A s  i t  seemed 
*National  Research Council  Assoc ia te .  
This  paper  d e s c r i b e s  how t h e i r  performance 
probable  t h a t  a r o u s a l  would be c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  some a s p e c t s  of performance, 
i t  w a s  decided t o  record t h e  h e a r t  r a t e  of t h e  t h r e e  crew members f o r  t h e  
e n t i r e  t i m e  they were i n  t h e  s imula tor .  
An experiment of t h i s  s i z e  cannot  be undertaken without  t h e  coopera t ion  
of many people  and o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  M r .  John G r i f f i n ,  a s t u d e n t  a t  F o o t h i l l  
Col lege,  e d i t e d  t h e  background record ings  of ATC communications and i n t e g r a t e d  
t h e s e  w i t h  t h e  s c e n a r i o s .  H e  a l s o  helped w i t h  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  of t h e  audio  and 
h e a r t - r a t e  d a t a  and w i t h  t h e  compilat ion of e r r o r s .  M r .  George Cooper, who 
r e c e n t l y  r e t i r e d  as Chief T e s t  P i l o t  of NASA Ames Research Center ,  gave e x p e r t  
h e l p  i n  d e v i s i n g  t h e  s c e n a r i o  and i n  running t h e  s t u d y .  I a m  indebted t o  t h e  
Nat iona l  Research Council  f o r  t h e i r  support  and I a m  most g r a t e f u l  f o r  t h e  
cont inuing  i n t e r e s t  and guidance of my s c i e n t i f i c  a d v i s e r ,  wi thout  whom t h i s  
s tudy  would n o t  have been undertaken.  
METHOD 
F u l l  miss ion  s i m u l a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  a degree  of realism a v a i l a b l e  only  i n  
t h e  m o s t  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  a i r l i n e  t r a i n i n g  s imula tor  and t h e  s u b j e c t s  must b e  
aircrews c u r r e n t  i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  type  of a i r c r a f t  and o p e r a t i o n .  R e l a t i n g  
t h i s  s t u d y  t o  a contemporary wide-body t r a n s p o r t  a i r c r a f t  seemed a p p r o p r i a t e  
because they  have been used by t h e  a i r l i n e s  f o r  several y e a r s  a n d ' a r e  l i k e l y  
t o  be  one of t h e  mainstays of c i v i l  a v i a t i o n  f o r  many y e a r s  t o  come. 
The s c e n a r i o  cannot  b e  w r i t t e n  wi thout  d e t a i l e d  knowledge of t h e  opera- 
t i o n  of t h e  a i r l i n e ,  t h e  a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  system and t h e  systems and 
c a p a b i l i t i e s  of t h e  chosen a i r c r a f t .  The observers  must a l s o  have t h e  same 
kind of knowledge. Recording f a c i l i t i e s  must be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h e i r  comments, 
as w e l l  as a cont inuous p r i n t o u t  of v a l u e s  f o r  a i r c r a f t  performance, naviga- 
t i o n ,  and communication. 
S imula t o r  
The s i m u l a t o r  used i n  t h i s  s tudy ,  manufactured by Singer-Link, had a 
motion p la t form w i t h  s i x  degrees  of freedom. 
f o r  long-haul o p e r a t i o n ,  and t h e r e  were t h r e e  crew s t a t i o n s  f o r  c a p t a i n ,  
c o p i l o t  and f l i g h t  engineer  ( t h e s e  p o s i t i o n s  and t h e i r  occupants  are annota ted  
as P1,  P2 ,  and P3,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  throughout t h i s  r e p o r t ) .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  
t h r e e  p o s i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  crew on t h e  f l i g h t  deck, t h e  s i m u l a t o r  cab a l s o  
included p o s i t i o n s  f o r  p i l o t  and engineer  i n s t r u c t o r s  who a l s o ,  i n  normal 
t r a i n i n g  func t ion ,  a c t e d  as s i m u l a t o r  o p e r a t o r s .  There were f a c i l i t i e s  
f o r  i n s e r t i n g  a i r c r a f t ,  runway, and environmental  c o n d i t i o n s  i n t o  t h e  simula- 
t i o n  program. A i r c r a f t  system f a u l t s  could a l s o  be  i n s t i g a t e d  wi thout  t h e  
knowledge of t h e  crew members. The s imula tor  w a s  equipped w i t h  a v i s u a l  
a t tachment  t h a t  allowed t h e  p i l o t  t o  t r a n s f e r  from ins t rument  t o  v i s u a l  f l i g h t  
dur ing  t h e  approach. The v i s u a l  system could be  programmed by t h e  s i m u l a t o r  
o p e r a t o r  t o  m i m i c  changes i n  cloud base.  
The f l i g h t  deck w a s  conf igured  
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The c r e w  members could converse e i t h e r  w i t h  o r  wi thout  e lectr ical  
intercom." I n  t h e  l a t te r  case, t h e i r  conve r sa t ion  w a s  picked up by a 
s e p a r a t e  microphone i n  t h e  roof of t h e  f l i g h t  deck. A i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  
(ATC) communications f o r  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  f l i g h t  were s imula ted  by t h e  o p e r a t o r ,  
who a l s o  ac t ed  as t h e  a i r l i n e  d i s p a t c h e r  when t h e  crew communicated wi th  t h e  
ope ra t ions  department .  The s imula to r  w a s  modif ied so t h a t  a l l  air-to-ground 
communications could be  recorded.  
I 11 
I 
To i n c r e a s e  realism and provide  a s tandard  l e v e l  of d i s t r a c t i o n  f o r  each 
s e c t i o n  of t h e  f l i g h t ,  background ATC communications w i t h  o t h e r  a i r c r a f t  w e r e  
i n j e c t e d  i n t o  t h e  crew's intercom. This  w a s  accomplished by r eco rd ing  messages 
du r ing  a c t u a l  f l i g h t  ope ra t ions .  Twelve d i f f e r e n t  t apes  w e r e  made f o r  each 
of t h e  two s e c t o r s  of t he  s c e n a r i o ,  cover ing  t h e  r o u t e s  from Dul l e s  t o  Kennedy 
a i r p o r t s  and t h e  r o u t e  from Kennedy t o  t h e  p o i n t  of r e t u r n  d i c t a t e d  by t h e  
s c e n a r i o  f o r  t h e  f l i g h t  t o  London. The r eco rd ings  included ground c o n t r o l  and 
tower messages f o r  each a i r f i e l d ,  c l e a r a n c e  d e l i v e r y ,  Automatic Terminal 
Informat ion  Se rv ice  (ATIS), r e l e v a n t  d e p a r t u r e  and approach c o n t r o l s ,  as w e l l  
as en rou te  s e c t i o n s  of t h e  f l i g h t s .  
Scenar io  
Simulator  t i m e  w a s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  b locks  of 4.5 h r ,  which t h e  s c e n a r i o  had 
t o  be  cons t r a ined  t o  f i t .  I t  w a s  necessary  t o  choose r o u t e s  un fami l i a r  t o  t h e  
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  c r e w s  t h a t  would provide  both  h igh  and low workload. 
s imula ted  o p e r a t i o n  w a s  t h a t  of a c h a r t e r  s e r v i c e . f r o m  Dul l e s  (Washington) t o  
Heathrow (London), s topping  b r i e f l y  a t  Kennedy (New York) f o r  f u e l i n g  and 
u p l i f t i n g  of s e r e n d i p i t y  cargo.  The s c e n a r i o  could thus  be  d iv ided  i n t o  two 
s e p a r a t e  s e c t o r s .  
The 
The f i r s t  s e c t o r ,  r e q u i r i n g  about 45 min f l y i n g  t i m e ,  w a s  designed t o  be 
conducted u s i n g  s tandard  o p e r a t i n g  a i r  t r a f f i c  and n a v i g a t i o n a l  procedures .  
During t h i s  s e c t o r  n e i t h e r  weather  nor  runway cond i t ions  f o r  takeoff  o r  landing  
would provide  any d i f f i c u l t y  f o r  a r e g u l a r  a i r l i n e  c r e w ,  and, a l though one 
of t h e  a u t o p i l o t s  w a s  unse rv iceab le ,  no f u r t h e r  mechanical f a i l u r e s  occurred .  
Never the less ,  du r ing  t h e  c r u i s e  phase of t h e  f i r s t  s e c t o r ,  t h e  c r e w s  w e r e  
warned about  thunderstorm a c t i v i t y  by ATC and were subsequent ly  d i v e r t e d  
around t h i s  by r a d a r  v e c t o r s .  No a c t i o n  w a s  r equ i r ed  by t h e  crew except  t o  
a c t i v a t e  engine  n a c e l l e  ice p r o t e c t i o n  and t o  warn t h e  passengers  t o  f a s t e n  
t h e i r  seat b e l t s .  It w a s  hoped t h a t  t h i s  i n i t i a l  s e c t o r  would provide  a 
comparat ively low workload s i t u a t i o n ,  a l low c r e w s  t o  become f a m i l i a r  w i th  each 
o t h e r ,  and f o r g e t f u l  of t h e  ECG e l e c t r o d e s  and s imula to r  environment. A t  t h e  
end of t h e  f i r s t  s e c t o r ,  a quick  turn-around, l a s t i n g  about 30 min, w a s  simu- 
l a t e d  wh i l e  e x t r a  f u e l  and cargo w e r e  loaded.  
The second s e c t o r  w a s  planned t o  produce a h igh  workload s i t u a t i o n  
r e q u i r i n g  decisionmaking i n  the  contex t  of complicated i n t e r a c t i n g  f a c t o r s .  
The a i r c r a f t  w a s  ve ry  heavy (almost a t  maximum gross  weight f o r  t a k e o f f ) ,  t h e  
runway cond i t ions  and wind were margina l  f o r  t h i s  weight ,  t h e  s t anda rd  i n s t r u -  
ment d e p a r t u r e  (SID) from New York w a s  complicated,  and t h e  publ i shed  i n s t r u c -  
t i o n s  f o r  i t  unc lea r  ( f i g .  1 ) .  There w a s  a l s o  a l a s t  minute  change i n  t h e  
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NEW YORK, N.Y. 
S P P - n  JUN 13-75 0 
Standard Instrument Departure (SIDJ 
EETS F A A  R E Q U I R E M E N T S  F O R  A E R O N A U T I C A L  C H A R T S  KENNEDY IN!C 
BELLE TERRE S E V E N  DEPARTURE (9LE7.9LE) 
N O T  TO S C A L E  
BELLE TERRE 
N41 02.0 W073 08.4 
FOR VECTORS TO C R I  R-176. 
00 NOT PROCEED WEST 
OF CRI R-039 
/- 
M A I N T A I N  2500 
TRANSITION 
Pawling (9LE7 -PWL):  F r o m  Be l l eTerreInt .  
BELLETERRE SEVEN DEPARTURE(9LES.SLE) to Pawling VORTAC (52 NM): Via  Bridge-  
po r t  R-197. Bridgeport  R-007, and V-91 
T 
TAKE-OFF . . . - -. .
Runway 31L/R: Turn lef t ;  c l imb  on headin0 
270" for vec to r s  to Cana r s i e  R-176. Do not 
proceed west o f c a n a r s i e  R-039. V iaCanar s i e  
R-176 and vec to r s  to V-229. V-229 to B e l k  
T e r r e  Int C r o s s  Kennedy R-252 at andmain -  
ta in  2500'. Then v i a  i t ransi t ion)  o r i a s s lgned  
rout e 1. 
Runway 22L/R: Climb on  runway heading 
for vec to r s  to V-229. V-229 to Bel le  T e r r e  
Int . .  maintain 5000'. Then v i a  i t ransi t ion)  o r  
( a s s i aned  rou te ) .  
Runway 4L/R: T u r n  r igh t ,  c l imb on  heading 
100" f o r  veo to r s  to V-229. V-229 to Bel le  
T e r r e  Int..  maintain 5000'. Then via I t r ans -  
i t ion)  or ( a s s igned  rou te ) .  
Runway 13L/R: Climb on assigned depa r tu re  
heading f o r  vec to r s  to V-229. V-2'3 to Bel le  
T e r r e  Int..  maintain 5000 T h -  v i a  ( t r ans -  
ition) or  (ass igned rou te ) .  
TRANSITIONS (FOR AIRCRAFT FLIGHT 
OPERATE AT FL 180 OR ABOVE). 
PLANNED TO 
Bangor (9LE7.BGR): F r o m  B e l l e  T e r r e  Int. 
to Bangor VORTAC (340 NM): Via Bridge-  
port R-197, Bridgeport  R-007, Cambridge 
R-189 and 5-49. 
Burlington (9LE7'BTV):  From Belle T e r r e  
Jnt. to Burlington VORTAC (202  NM): Via 
Bridgeport  R-197, Bridgeport  R-007, Cam-  
b r idge  R-189. Cambridge R-019 and Burl ing-  
ton R-200. 
Cambridge (SLE7'CAM): From Belle Terre  
Int. to Cambridge VORTAC (118 NM): Via 
Bridgeport  R-197, Bridgeport R-007and Cam- 
bridge R-189. 
Kennebunk (9LE7 *ENE):  F r o m  B e l l e  T e r r e  
kit. to Kennebunk VORTAC (239  NM): Via  
Bridgeport  R-197, Bridgeport  R-007. Cam- 
br idge R-189, and 5.547. 
C H A N G E S :  Graphic portrayal rake-off runw-7 31L/R. @ l 9 n l l , . I , E N L C O  D L n V l l  COLD Y I .  A l , l , O l l l l t S E . " E D  
Figure 1.- Belle Terre Seven Departure, Kennedy International Airport. 
Copyright 1978 Jeppesen fi Co. (or Jeppesen Sandersen, Inc.) 
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i c lea rance  t h a t  modif ied t h e  SID.  This  d e p a r t u r e  w a s  followed by a long  and 
unevent fu l  climb f o r  25 t o  30 min t o  an a l t i t u d e  of 31,000 f t .  A t  t h e  top  of 
t h e  climb, a f t e r  c r u i s e  speed had been a t t a i n e d  and t h e  equ iva len t  power 
s e l e c t e d ,  slow c logging  of t h e  o i l  f i l t e r  f o r  No. 2 engine w a s  a c t i v a t e d .  
This  c logging  a f f e c t e d  the  d i f f e r e n t i a l  p re s su re  a c r o s s  t.he f i l t e r  and was 
shown on a combined o i l  p r e s s u r e  gauge on t h e  s y s t e m s  pane l  monitored by P 3 .  
A t  a c e r t a i n  va lue ,  an  annota ted  warning l i g h t  on t h e  c e n t r a l  warning pane l ,  
s i t u a t e d  t o  the  r i g h t  of P l ' s  f l i g h t  i n s t rumen t s ,  w a s  i l l umina ted .  The allow- 
a b l e  p r e s s u r e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  w a s  exceeded and t h e  engine  had t o  be s h u t  down; 
thus  a n  oppor tun i ty  w a s  provided f o r  a s s e s s i n g  v i g i l a n c e  and d e c i s i o n  t imes.  
The clogged o i l  f i l t e r  p r e s e n t s  t h e  crew wi th  s e v e r a l  i n t e r a c t i n g  
problems t h a t  need informat ion  r e t r i e v a l  and consequent d e c i s i o n s .  Because 
of range and lower redundancy, i t  i s  immediately obvious t h a t  t h e  f l i g h t  t o  
London must be  abandoned. Furthermore,  t h e  31,000 f t  a l t i t u d e  cannot b e  
maintained on t h e  remaining engines  wi thout  unacceptably overboos t ing  them. 
This  combination of f a c t o r s  creates a need f o r  i n t e r a c t i o n  w i t h  a i r  t r a f f i c  
c o n t r o l  as to  t h e  n e a r e s t  a i r p o r t  w i th  s u i t a b l e  weather and runway c o n d i t i o n s  
and how nav iga t ion  t o  t h i s  d e s t i n a t i o n  i s  t o  be  achieved.  With t h e  f u e l  load  
f o r  London, t h e m i r c r a f t  is  much overweight f o r  a l and ing  i n  t h e  n o r t h e a s t e r n  
United States over  which i t  is  f l y i n g .  There is a r i g h t  t i m e  and p l a c e  when 
enough f u e l  must be dumped t o  a l low f o r  a s a f e  l and ing  on t h e  chosen a l t e r n a t e  
a i r f i e l d ,  wh i l e  r e t a i n i n g  enough as a r e s e r v e  f o r  a f u r t h e r  d i v e r s i o n  should 
t h e  chosen runway be  unava i l ab le .  
By manipula t ing  t h e  weather and runway cond i t ions ,  t h e  s c e n a r i o  f o r c e s  
t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  r e t u r n  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  runway a t  Kennedy A i r p o r t ,  t h e  o t h e r s  
being precluded by t h e  s t r e n g t h  of t h e  crosswind and by o b s t r u c t i o n  from 
r e p a i r  work i n  p rogres s  o r  damaged a i r c r a f t ;  t o  a c e r t a i n  e x t e n t  t h e s e  condi- 
t i o n s  s t a n d a r d i z e  t h e  t a s k s  and workload. A t  a p a r t i c u l a r  p o i n t  dur ing  t h i s  
r e t u r n ,  wh i l e  t he  t h i r d  p i l o t  (P3)  i s  engaged i n  dumping t h e  f u e l ,  t h e  No. 3 
hydrau l i c  system i s  slowly dep le t ed  t o  zero.  This  f u r t h e r  f a i l u r e  provides  
an  oppor tun i ty  f o r  measuring t h e  v i g i l a n c e  of a busy P3 and f u r t h e r  a f f e c t s  
t h e  o p e r a t i o n  of  t h e  a i r c r a f t .  The only  important  consequence is t h a t  t h e  
second and only  remaining a u t o p i l o t  f a i l s ,  t hus  n e c e s s i t a t i n g  hand f l y i n g  
of t h e  a i r c r a f t  and f u r t h e r  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  workload. 
On nea r ing  New York, t h e  crew is  requ i r ed  by a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  t o  
f l y  a s p e c i f i c  ho ld ing  p a t t e r n  a t  a t i m e  when they are concerned wi th  t h e  
l e g a l i t y  of t h e  marginal  weather a t  New York and t h e  s h o r t  l e n g t h  of t h e  
runway i n  use .  F i n a l l y ,  a hand-flown I L S  approach must be made wi th  
asymmetric power t o  a r e l a t i v e l y  s l i p p e r y  runway wi th  s t r o n g  crosswind,  
followed by a landing  t h a t  i s  s a f e  only  wi th  t h e  c o r r e c t  amount of au tomat ic  
brak ing  and immediate a p p l i c a t i o n  of symmetrical reverse t h r u s t .  
The second s e c t o r  t hus  provides  a s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  s t a r t s  wi th  d i f f i c u l t y  
and i s  followed by a per iod  of low workload t h a t  tends  t o  l u l l  t h e  crew i n t o  
complacency. 
i n c r e a s i n g  informat ion  r e t r i e v a l ,  decisionmaking, and s k i l l .  Ext ra  ha r ra s s -  
ment is provided by t h e  s imula t ion  of a cab in  crew member r e l a y i n g  compla in ts  
and r e q u e s t s  from upse t  and anxious passengers .  The whole of t h i s  s c e n a r i o  
Then t h e r e  i s  a sudden o n s e t  of c i rcumstances  r e q u i r i n g  ever- 
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w a s  based on s i t u a t i o n s  t h a t  had happened i n  real  l i f e ,  and none of t h e  
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  crews considered t h a t  t h e  s imulated s i t u a t i o n s  were i n  any way 
u n r e a l i s t i c .  
S u b j e c t s  
The p a r t i c i p a t i n g  aircrew w e r e  a l l  v o l u n t e e r s  from t h e  same carrier and 
w e r e  i n  c u r r e n t  f l y i n g  p r a c t i c e  i n  t h e  a i r c r a f t  on scheduled a i r l i n e  r o u t e s .  
Twenty crews, each c o n s i s t i n g  of a c a p t a i n ,  a f i r s t  o f f i c e r  and a f l i g h t  
engineer ,  w e r e  s e l e c t e d  from a t o t a l  of 140 crew members who volunteered  on 
t h e  b a s i s  of t h e i r  a v a i l a b i l i t y  a t  t h e  times t h e  s i m u l a t o r  s e s s i o n s  had been 
made a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h e  s tudy .  Although t h e  s u b j e c t s  were v o l u n t e e r s  and n o t  
s e l e c t e d  a t  random, they formed about  30% of t h e  s t r e n g t h  of t h e  aircrew a t  
t h e  domici le  from which most of them came. 
The f i r s t  two complete c r e w s  w e r e  used t o  make s u r e  t h a t  a l l  t h e  r e c o r d i n g  
methods could be  i n t e g r a t e d  and observers  p o s i t i o n e d  s o  as n o t  t o  b e  o b t r u s i v e .  
These pre l iminary  runs  a l s o  gave t h e  i n s t r u c t o r / s i m u l a t o r  o p e r a t o r  p r a c t i c e  i n  
s t a n d a r d i z i n g  ATC and communication procedures .  Only 18 crews w e r e  a v a i l a b l e  
f o r  t h e  "data" runs .  Q: 
The a g e s  of t h e  crew members v a r i e d  between 54 and 59 f o r  c a p t a i n s ,  38 t o  
50 f o r  c o p i l o t s ,  and 4 5  t o  58 f o r  f l i g h t  engineers .  The t o t a l  y e a r s  of f l y i n g  
were between 3 3  and 4 1  f o r  t h e  c a p t a i n s ,  1 6  and 32 f o r  t h e  c o p i l o t s ,  and 20 
and 37 f o r  t h e  f l i g h t  engineers .  T o t a l  f l y i n g  t i m e  w a s  u s u a l l y  about  500 
t o  750 h r  f o r  every yea r .  The exper ience  of t h e  group on t h i s  type  of a i r c r a f t  
w a s  more v a r i a b l e ,  t h a t  of t h e  c a p t a i n s  between 6 months and 6 y e a r s ,  t h a t  of 
t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r s  between 6 months and 4 y e a r s ,  and t h a t  of t h e  f l i g h t  engi- 
n e e r s  between 1 and 6 y e a r s .  A l l  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  crew members had accumulated 
about  600 h r  f o r  every  year  they had been f l y i n g  t h e  a i r c r a f t  ( t a b l e  1). 
The informat ion  recorded about  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  crew members inc luded  
days s i n c e  l a s t  f l i g h t ,  days away from home i n  t h e  l as t  5 days ,  and hours  o u t  
of bed p r i o r  t o  r e p o r t i n g  f o r  t h e  s i m u l a t o r  r u n  ( t a b l e  2 ) .  
Exp er imen t er s 
A team of  people  r a n  t h e  experiment:  a n  i n s t r u c t o r / s i m u l a t o r  o p e r a t o r ,  
two o b s e r v e r s ,  and a t e c h n i c i a n  t o  change t h e  background r e c o r d i n g s  f o r  t h e  
ATC communications. The i n s t r u c t o r / s i m u l a t o r  o p e r a t o r  w a s  a s e n i o r  f l i g h t  
i n s t r u c t o r  employed by t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  a i r l i n e  w i t h  a l i f e t i m e  exper ience  
of o p e r a t i n g  i n  several a i r l i n e s  throughout t h e  world,  as w e l l  as many y e a r s  
of teaching  i n  s i m u l a t o r s .  H e  helped d e v i s e  t h e  s c e n a r i o ,  encouraged t h e  crews 
t o  v o l u n t e e r ,  and arranged t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  t o  f i t  i n  w i t h  t h e i r  a i r l i n e  
work schedule .  During t h e  runs  he a c t e d  as d i s p a t c h e r  b e f o r e  t h e  s i m u l a t o r  
f l i g h t s ,  programmed t h e  s c e n a r i o  i n  a s tandard ized  f a s h i o n  and gave t h e  bene- 
f i t  of h i s  o b s e r v a t i o n  of t h e  performance of t h e  crews a t  t h e  d e b r i e f i n g .  
One observer  w a s  t h e  a u t h o r ,  who i s  a phys ic ian  w i t h  a background of 
human f a c t o r s  i n  a v i a t i o n  and a n  experienced p i l o t  f a m i l i a r  w i t h  observ ing  
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Three of t h e s e  i n  motel  f o r  t r a i n i n g .  b 
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a i r l i n e  f l i g h t c r e w s  under many d i f f e r e n t  cond i t ions ,  both i n  f l i g h t  and i n  
s imula to r s .  P r i o r  t o  t h e  experimental  p a r t  of t h i s  s tudy ,  he  a t t ended  a 4-wk 
cour se  of i n s t r u c t i o n  a t  t h e  ground school  of t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  a i r l i n e  t o  
l e a r n  about  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  a i r c r a f t  and i t s  systems. 
H e  wi tnessed  t h e  convers ion  t r a i n i n g  of a i r c rew,  both  i n  t h e  s imula to r  and 
subsequent ly  i n  t h e  a i r ,  and undertook o b s e r v a t i o n a l  t r i p s  w i th  r e g u l a r  l i n e -  
crews on t h e  same a i r l i n e .  This  p r e p a r a t i o n  w a s  e s s e n t i a l ,  bo th  t o  mold t h e  
s c e n a r i o  and t o  understand t h e  s tandard  ope ra t ing  procedures  and n o t i c e  any 
d e p a r t u r e s  from them. During t h e  experiment he gave s p e c i a l  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
the  a c t i v i t i e s  of t h e  c a p t a i n s  and f i r s t  o f f i c e r s  ( P l ' s  and P 2 ' s ) .  
The o t h e r  observer  w a s  a psycho log i s t  w i th  a p i l o t ' s  l i c e n s e ,  a background 
i n  human f a c t o r s  and exper ience  i n  observ ing  t h e  performance of a i r c rew i n  
f l i g h t  and i n  s imula to r s .  H e  gave s p e c i a l  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  behavior  of t h e  
f l i g h t  eng inee r s  (P3 ' s ) .  
i n g  equipment and i t s  i n s t a l l a t i o n  i n  t h e  s imula tor  and f o r  i n t e g r a t i n g  
mod i f i ca t ions  wi th  i t s  maintenance s t a f f .  
H e  w a s  a l s o  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  coord ina t ing  t h e  record-  
The t e c h n i c i a n  w a s  a work-study s t u d e n t  from NASA Ames Research Center  
who w a s  s tudying  a e r o n a u t i c s  a t  a l o c a l  c o l l e g e  and who i s  a v e t e r a n  IJSAF 
f l i g h t  crewman (an a i r - r e f u e l i n g  boom o p e r a t o r ) .  H e  a l s o  ho lds  a p r i v a t e  
p i l o t ' s  l i c e n s e .  The t e c h n i c i a n ' s  main t a s k  w a s  t o  synchronize t h e  background 
communication t a p e s  f o r  t h e  v a r i o u s  ATC s e c t o r s .  
Recordings 
F ive  c a t e g o r i e s  of d a t a  were recorded:  t h e  comments made by t h e  observ- 
ers and t h e  s imula to r  ope ra to r  about  t h e  performance of t h e  crew members; t h e  
computations made by t h e  crew p r i o r  t o  and du r ing  t h e  f l i g h t ;  t h e  communica- 
t i o n s  between crew members and t h e  s imulated a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l ;  t h e  a i r c r a f t  
parameters  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  t a s k ;  and cont inuous e lec t rocard iograms f o r  t h e  
t h r e e  crew members. 
Observers' eoments- The two observers  were i n  the  s imula to r  cab w i t h  
t h e  c r e w  and w e r e  a b l e  to  comment on t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s .  The obse rve r s  a l s o  
took n o t e  of any a i r c r a f t  parameters  they thought p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  
c u r r e n t  s i t u a t i o n  and of t h e  t i m e  s i n c e  t h e  start of t a k e o f f .  These comments 
were recorded on two s e p a r a t e  d i r e c t  channels  of a c o n t i n u a l l y  running seven- 
t r a c k  t ape  r eco rde r .  
A s  much as p o s s i b l e ,  obse rve r s  maintained a cont inuous "running commen- 
t a ry"  dur ing  t h e  t i m e  t h a t  t h e  crew were i n  t h e  cab,  so  t h a t  p r e f l i g h t  as w e l l  
as i n - f l i g h t  a c t i v i t i e s  were recorded ,  most a t t e n t i o n  be ing  paid t o  a c t i v i t i e s  
dur ing  f l i g h t .  The a c t i v i t i e s  recorded inc luded:  t h e  p i l o t  c u r r e n t l y  i n  
c o n t r o l  of t h e  a i r c r a f t ,  which au tomat ic  c o n t r o l  modes were s e l e c t e d ,  t h e  t i m e  
and sequence of ope ra t ion  of c o n t r o l s  a f f e c t i n g  a i rc raf t  conf igu ra t ion ,  and 
t h e  i d e n t i t y  and r a d i o  frequency of t h e  nav iga t ion  f a c i l i t i e s  s e l e c t e d ,  
t oge the r  w i th  t h e  r equ i r ed  t r a c k  and heading.  Not ice  w a s  t aken  of t h e  t i m e  
spen t  looking  a t  c h a r t s  and approach p l a t e s ,  t h e  u s e  of normal and abnormal 
c h e c k l i s t s ,  and t h e  r e t r i e v a l  of d a t a  from a i r c r a f t  and f l i g h t  ope ra t ing  
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manuals. Note w a s  a l s o  made of t h e  management of a i r c r a f t  systems by t h e  
f l i g h t  engineer  ( P 3 ) ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  way he  d e a l t  w i t h  requirements ,  such as 
f u e l  dumping, and how t h e s e  i n t e r f e r e d  w i t h  h i s  i n t e g r a t i o n  w i t h  o t h e r  crew 
members. 
A t  t h e  end of  each s e s s i o n ,  t h e  observers  and t h e  s imula tor  o p e r a t o r  
he ld  a d e b r i e f i n g  s e s s i o n .  During t h i s  s e s s i o n  a n  a t tempt  w a s  made t o  recall  
any s p e c i a l  f e a t u r e s  of performance i n  t h e  two s e c t o r s ,  such as s i g n i f i c a n t  
e r r o r s  and r e l a t e d  f a c t o r s  t h a t  might be  included i n  " f l y i n g  s t y l e "  and 
i d i o s y n c r a s i e s .  This  in format ion  w a s  recorded longhand on proformas. 
Crew paperwork- A l l  t h e  paperwork r e l a t i n g  t o  each run was c o l l e c t e d  
and l a t e r  perused f o r  e r r o r s .  This  included t h e  takeoff  computation s h e e t ,  
t h e  form f o r  t h e  second o f f i c e r ' s  (P3) f u e l  computation, and t h e  n o t e s  pre- 
pared f o r  t h e  takeoff  and approach i n d i c a t e d  a i r s p e e d s .  
Eleetroeardiograms- A s i n g l e  l ead  ECG was taken f o r  each crew member 
dur ing  t h e  whole t i m e  he  w a s  s e a t e d  i n  t h e  cab. Three H e w l e t t  Packard pre- 
j e l l e d  d isposable  e l e c t r o d e s  had previous ly  been a t t a c h e d  a t  t h e  f r o n t  and 
s i d e s  of  h i s  c h e s t .  Leads from t h e  e l e c t r o d e s  w e r e  a t t a c h e d  t o  preampl i f i -  
ers i n  pockets  behind t h e  seats. The ampl i f ied  s i g n a l s  went v i a  sckeened 
l e a d s  t o  t h r e e  FM channels  of t h e  seven-track t a p e  r e c o r d e r  a t  t h e  rear of 
t h e  cab. 
Flight deck communications Most of t h e  v e r b a l  communications between 
crew members were picked up on a s e p a r a t e  microphone s i t u a t e d  i n  t h e  roof of 
t h e  s i m u l a t o r .  The s i g n a l s  from t h i s  were recorded on a s e p a r a t e  d i r e c t  
channel  of t h e  seven-track t a p e  recorder .  
The s i m u l a t o r  c i r c u i t s  c a r r y i n g  communications made by crew members 
w i t h  ground f a c i l i t i e s  w e r e  tapped, and t h e  s i g n a l s  w e r e  a l s o  f e d  i n t o  another  
d i r e c t  channel  of t h e  t a p e  r e c o r d e r .  
Aircra f t  Parameters- The a i r c r a f t  parameters  considered a p p r o p r i a t e  
f o r  a s s e s s i n g  crew performance were obta ined  from t h e  d i g i t a l  computer con- 
t r o l l i n g  t h e  s i m u l a t o r  and recorded on a high-speed l i n e  p r i n t e r .  There w a s  
i n s u f f i c i e n t  time p r i o r  t o  t h e  experiment t o  make arrangements f o r  t h i s  
in format ion  a l s o  t o  b e  recorded i n  d i g i t a l  form on magnetic t ape .  The v a l u e s  
d isp layed  were: i n d i c a t e d  a i r s p e e d ,  p r e s s u r e  a l t i t u d e ,  i n s t a n t a n e o u s  ve r t i ca l  
speed, heading,  a n g l e  of  a t t a c k ,  la teral  d e v i a t i o n  from t h e  r e q u i r e d  naviga- 
t i o n a l  p a t h  i n  a n g l e  and d i s t a n c e ,  similar d e v i a t i o n  i n  a n g l e  and d i s t a n c e  
from t h e  d e s i r e d  ins t rument  landing  system ( I L S )  g l i d e  s l o p e ,  t h e  p o s i t i o n  
of t h e  landing  g e a r ,  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of t h e  f l a p s  i n  increments  of one degree  
and t h a t  of t h e  s p o i l e r s ,  t h e  engine p r e s s u r e  r a t i o  f o r  No. 1 engine (repre-  
s e n t i n g  power s e t t i n g ) ,  t h e  f r e q u e n c i e s  set i n  No. 1 n a v i g a t i o n  receiver, 
No. 1 communication r e c e i v e r ,  and No. 1 automatic  d i r e c t i o n  f i n d e r  (ADF), 
t h e  e lapsed  t i m e  s i n c e  t a k e o f f ,  and t h e  t o t a l  f u e l  remaining. 
The l i n e  p r i n t e r  w a s  s t a r t e d  as power w a s  a p p l i e d  f o r  takeoff  and s topped 
a t  t h e  end of t h e  l a n d i n g  run.  The v a l u e s  were p r i n t e d  every  second below 
1800 f t  and every f i v e  sec above t h a t  h e i g h t .  
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Procedures  
A l l  of t h e  v o l u n t e e r  crew members had previous ly  been made aware of 
t h e  purpose of t h e  s tudy  and had agreed t o  t h e  r e c o r d i n g  of t h e i r  performance 
as w e l l  as t h e i r  h e a r t  rates. They d i d  n o t  know any d e t a i l s  of t h e  s c e n a r i o  
b e f o r e  they  r e p o r t e d  a t  t h e  t r a i n i n g  f a c i l i t y .  
menter who f i r s t  impressed upon them t h e  need f o r  s e c r e c y  as t o  t h e  c o n t e n t  of 
t h e  s c e n a r i o  u n t i l  t h e  t r ia ls  were ove r ,  p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  even g e n e r a l  
knowledge of i t  by subsequent s u b j e c t s  would i n v a l i d a t e  t h e  s tudy .  Details  
of t h e i r  age,  exper ience  and o t h e r  f a c t s  as p r e v i o u s l y  mentioned w e r e  then  
recorded.  The ECG e l e c t r o d e s  were a p p l i e d ,  a s s u r a n c e  being g iven  t h a t  t h e  
p h y s i o l o g i c a l  d a t a ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  any r e c o r d s  of performance which would b e  
made d u r i n g  t h e  c o u r s e  of t h e  run ,  would b e  guaranteed anonymity. 
They w e r e  m e t  by a n  experi-  
The t h r e e  c r e w  members then  moved t o  a b r i e f i n g  room where they  m e t  t h e  
p r o j e c t  c o o r d i n a t o r ,  who a c t e d  as t h e  d i s p a t c h e r .  H e  t o l d  them t h e  f l i g h t  
f o r  which they  had been scheduled and provided them w i t h  t h e  s t a n d a r d  paper- 
work f o r  t h e  f l i g h t .  This  included t h e  d e p a r t u r e  t i m e ,  weather f o r  t h e  whole 
r o u t e ,  t h e  two in tended  d e s t i n a t i o n s ,  t h e  r o u t e s  t o  be  fol lowed,  t h e  weight 
and ba lance  of t h e  a i r c r a f t ,  and t h e  runway a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h e  d e p a r t u r e .  
A l l  t h i s  in format ion  w a s  i n  t h e  same form as they would normally have on a 
r e g u l a r  f l i g h t ,  having been copied from a c t u a l  f l i g h t  documents t h a t  had been 
i ssued  t o  f l i g h t s  d e p a r t i n g  from D u l l e s  and Kennedy A i r p o r t s .  The t i m e  
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  f l i g h t  w a s  about  t h r e e - q u a r t e r s  of a n  hour.  
Usual ly  t h e  c r e w  members d i s c u s s e d  t h e  g e n e r a l  p l a n s  t o g e t h e r .  A f t e r  t h i s  
t h e  second o f f i c e r  went f i r s t  i n t o  t h e  cab t o  do t h e  p r e f l i g h t  checks w h i l e  
t h e  c a p t a i n  and t h e  f i r s t  o f f i c e r  cont inued t o  s tudy  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  of g r o s s  
takeoff  weight (GTOW), power s e t t i n g s  and runway c o n d i t i o n s ,  and t o  work o u t  
t h e  d e t a i l s  of t h e  naviga t ion .  They were a l l  i n  t h e  s i m u l a t o r  cab some 20 min 
b e f o r e  scheduled t ime of  d e p a r t u r e ;  as soon as they had taken  t h e i r  seats 
a n  experimenter  connected t h e i r  ECG l e a d s  t o  t h e  p r e a m p l i f i e r s  s t o r e d  i n  t h e  
pockets  i n  t h e  back of t h e  seats. The i n s t r u c t o r f s i m u l a t o r  o p e r a t o r  then  took 
h i s  p o s i t i o n  behind P1. The two obse rve r s  then boarded toge the r  w i t h  t h e  
o p e r a t o r  f o r  t h e  sequencing of t h e  background t apes .  
on a n  o s c i l l o s c o p e  and record ing  of  them s t a r t e d  a t  once. A f t e r  t h e  loudness  
levels  of t h e  v a r i o u s  audio i n p u t s  had been checked and a d j u s t e d ,  they  were 
connected t o  t h e  r e c o r d e r  and t h e  i n t e g r i t y  of a l l  t h e  i n p u t s  w a s  checked 
downstream from t h e  record ing  heads of t h e  mul t ichannel  t a p e  r e c o r d e r .  
The ECG'S w e r e  checked 
The t h r e e  ECG and f o u r  audio channels  w e r e  switched on and t h e  r e c o r d e r  
s t a r t e d  as soon as a l l  t h e  crew had s e t t l e d  i n  t h e i r  seats i n  t h e  cab. The 
l i n e  p r i n t o u t  of a i r c r a f t  parameters  w a s  n o t  s t a r t e d ,  however, u n t i l  t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  of power f o r  t a k e o f f .  Continiiing t h e i r  s tandard  p r e f l i g h t  pro- 
cedures ,  t h e  crew i n t e r a c t e d  w i t h  t h e  s imula ted  a i f  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l l e r  and 
ground handler  f o r  push-back, t ax i ,  t a k e o f f ,  and d e p a r t u r e  c l e a r a n c e s .  
P r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  t h e  f l i g h t  and i t s  e n t i r e  conduct were c a r r i e d  o u t  e x a c t l y  
as they would be  i n  real  l i f e .  
Preceding and d u r i n g  t h e  s imula ted  f l i g h t ,  t h e  o b s e r v e r s  commented 
cont inuous ly  on t h e  o p e r a t i o n  of  c o n t r o l s  f o r  a i r f r a m e ,  engines ,  a n c i l l a r y  
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equipment, and f u e l .  S p e c i a l  n o t i c e  w a s  taken of e r r o r s  i n  procedures  
( e .g . ,  t h e  u s e  of c h e c k l i s t s )  and of s p e c i f i c  e r r o r s  ( e .g . ,  mis takes  i n  
s e t t i n g  up nav iga t ion  and communication f r equenc ie s ) .  Also r epor t ed  w a s  
t h e  t i m e  taken t o  l o c a t e  informat ion  i n  documents i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e i r  
complexi ty ,  format ,  and a v a i l a b l e  i l l u m i n a t i o n .  
A t  t h e  end of t h e  f i r s t  s e c t o r  t h e  ECG l e a d s  w e r e  disconnected a t  t h e  
p r e a m p l i f i e r s  and t h e  crew allowed t o  l e a v e  t h e  cab t o  o b t a i n  l i g h t  r e f r e s h -  
ment. Reenter ing  t h e  cab a f t e r  a per iod  of about  20 min, they c a r r i e d  o u t  
t h e  same checks as they would on a s h o r t  turnaround on t h e  l i n e .  The crew 
then proceeded wi th  t h e  second s e c t o r  i n  t h e  same way as f o r  t h e  f i r s t ,  a l l  
nav iga t ion  and communication be ing  c a r r i e d  out  accord ing  t o  publ ished r o u t i n g  
and ATC i n s t r u c t i o n s  as dur ing  a c t u a l  f l i g h t  ope ra t ions .  
A t  t h e  end of t h e  second s e c t o r ,  t h e  crew members l e f t  the  s imula to r  
and t h e i r  e l e c t r o d e s  w e r e  removed. They w e r e  then  debr i e fed  f o r  t h e i r  
complaints  and comments i n  t h e  presence  of t h e  i n s t r u c t o r / s i m u l a t o r  o p e r a t o r  
and t h e  observers .  To avoid  any p o s s i b i l i t y  of conf ron ta t ion  o r  ill f e e l i n g  
no a t tempt  w a s  made t o  d i s c u s s  performance, f a u l t s  i n  f l y i n g  technique o r  
decisionmaking. 
s imula tor  ope ra to r  made a manuscript  record  of a l l  the s i g n i f i c a n t  factors 
t h a t  they could remember r e l a t i n g  t o  the  performance of t h e  crews i n  t h e  two 
s e c t o r s .  This  w a s  done as a p recau t ion  i n  c a s e  t h e r e  had been any f a i l u r e s  
i n  t h e  r eco rd ing  of observer  comments o r  a i r c r a f t  parameters .  
Af t e r  t h e  a i r c rew l e f t  t h e  experimenters  and t h e  i n s t r u c t o r /  
DATA REDUCTION 
Audio and ECG Channels 
The fou r  audio and t h r e e  ECG channels  conta ined  on a s i n g l e  1- in .  t a p e  
were played back toge the r .  During t h e  playback, each of t h e  fou r  audio  chan- 
n e l s  w a s  re recorded  on a s e p a r a t e  s i n g l e  channel  c a s s e t t e  r eco rde r ;  a l l  fou r  
were s t a r t e d  s imul taneous ly  wi th  t h e  seven-channel r eco rde r .  The s i g n a l s  from 
the  t h r e e  ECG channels  were fed  t o  a Gould-Bio-Tach t h a t  converted t h e  r a w  
ECG i n t o  a beat- to-beat  h e a r t - r a t e  s i g n a l .  The t h r e e  h e a r t - r a t e  s i g n a l s  were 
then recorded on a Brush seven-channel pen r eco rde r .  
The record ing  paper w a s  run  a t  a speed of 10  c m  pe r  min. P rov i s ion  w a s  
made f o r  swi tch ing  t o  r a w  ECG d a t a  should t h i s  be  r e q u i r e d ,  though t h i s  w a s  
no t  done r o u t i n e l y .  The pens w e r e  a d j u s t e d  s o  t h a t  f u l l  scale d e f l e c t i o n  
w a s  from 0 t o  200 b e a t s  pe r  min. Simultaneously wi th  t h e  r eco rd ing  of h e a r t  
rate, two experimenters  l i s t e n e d  t o  both  t h e  No. 1 o b s e r v e r ' s  channel  and 
t h a t  f o r  t h e  ATC communications. Both experimenters  l i s t e n e d  t o  one channel  
i n  each ear. 
To economize i n  t h e  r educ t ion  of less s i g n i f i c a n t  d a t a ,  t h e  t r a n s c r i p t i o n  
of t h e  p r e f l i g h t  h e a r t  rate and t h e  audio  channels  w a s  l i m i t e d  t o  10 min 
preceding t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of power f o r  t a k e o f f .  
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Simultaneously wi th  t h e  record ing  of t h e  h e a r t  rate, t h e  experimenters  
t r ansc r ibed  o t h e r  d a t a  onto  t h e  fou r  remaining columns of t h e  pen r eco rde r  
paper.  One of t h e s e  w a s  used f o r  t h e  a i r c r a f t  parameters ,  (e .g . ,  speeds ,  
h e i g h t s ,  passage of nav iga t ion  f i x e s ,  ATC c l e a r a n c e s ,  e t c . ) ,  wh i l e  t h e  o t h e r  





Most of t h e  crew's a c t i o n s  could be d iv ided  i n t o  con t inu ing  and d i s c r e t e  
ones.  The con t inu ing  a c t i o n s  inc luded  s tudying  maps and approach p l a t e s ,  
looking f o r  in format ion  i n  a i r c r a f t  manuals,  and c o n f e r r i n g  w i t h  another  crew 
member. The d i s c r e t e  a c t i o n s  were exempl i f ied  by l e v e r  o p e r a t i o n  (e .g . ,  gea r  
handle ,  f l a p s ,  s p o i l e r s ,  e t c . ) ,  t h e  s e t t i n g  of v a l u e s  r equ i r ed  f o r  nav iga t ion  
and communication frequency s e l e c t i o n ,  and headings and r a d i a l s  f o r  t h e  f l i g h t  
pa th  c o n t r o l .  
The re recorded  audio c a s s e t t e s ,  dubbed from each of t h e  fou r  audio chan- 
n e l s ,  were a l s o  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t r a n s c r i p t i o n  t o  a l low a more d e t a i l e d  assess- 
ment of such t h i n g s  as t h e  circumstances immediately preceding an i n c i d e n t  o r  
e r r o r ;  i f  t h e s e  were thought t o  be  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  t h e  cassettes w e r e  t r a n s c r i b e d  
s e p a r a t e l y  us ing  t h e  playback of an o f f i c e  d i c t a t i n g  machine. When t h e s e  pen 
recorded s t r i p  c h a r t s  wi th  t h e i r  w r i t t e n  comments w e r e  completed,  each w a s  
examined f o r  r e l e v a n t  d a t a .  Simultaneously,  t h e  p r i n t o u t  of t h e  a i r c r a f t  
parameters  w a s  placed i n  j u x t a p o s i t i o n  w i t h  t h e  s t r i p ;  t h u s ,  t h e r e  w a s  
cont inuous informat ion  a v a i l a b l e  throughout t h e  f l i g h t  t h a t  could be  used t o  
i n d i c a t e  a r o u s a l ,  v i g i l a n c e ,  d e c i s i o n  t i m e s ,  and e r r o r s ,  e i t h e r  t hose  noted 
by obse rve r s  o r  t hose  deduced by examining t h e  a i r c r a f t  va lues .  This  t a s k  
w a s  performed s e p a r a t e l y  f o r  each of t h e  36 s e c t o r s  and r e p r e s e n t s  a t o t a l  of 
80 h r  of record ings .  
A i r c r a f t  Parameters  
I d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of power a t  takeoff  i n  both  r eco rd ings  
ensured t h a t  t h e  l i n e s  of f i g u r e s  on t h e  p r i n t o u t  of t h e  a i r c r a f t  parameters  
could be  a c c u r a t e l y  a s s o c i a t e d  i n  t i m e  w i t h  t h e  pen r eco rde r  s t r i p .  The 
' p r i n t o u t  had a t i m e  column t h a t  s t a r t e d  aga in  from zero  every 10 min; u s ing  
these ,  i t  w a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  w r i t e  i n  t h e  t o t a l  e lapsed  t i m e  a t  each 5-min 
i n t e r v a l .  Thus, each l i n e  of p r i n t o u t  could be i d e n t i f i e d  and r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
pen r eco rde r  s t r i p  c h a r t  t o  an accuracy of 5 sec f o r  h e i g h t s  above 1800 f t  
and t o  1 sec f o r  h e i g h t s  below t h a t .  I n  t h i s  way a i r c r a f t  responses  could b e  
matched wi th  t h e  a c t i o n  of  the  v a r i o u s  c r e w  members and t h e i r  s imultaneous 
h e a r t  rates. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The immense amount of d e t a i l e d  d a t a  c o l l e c t e d  about  each of t h e  s e c t o r s  
makes i t  p o s s i b l e  t o  s tudy  almost  every a s p e c t  of each c r e w  members' t a s k s  
and how he w a s  a f f e c t e d  by a wide v a r i e t y  of c i rcumstances.  For i n s t a n c e ,  i t  
would be p o s s i b l e  t o  work o u t  t h e  amount of t i m e  i t  took any of t h e  s u b j e c t s  
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t o  l o c a t e  a s p e c i f i c  p i e c e  of in format ion  i n  a i r c r a f t  manuals, c h a r t s  o r  
approach p l a t e s .  I t  would be  p o s s i b l e  t o  a p p o r t i o n  t h e  t i m e  used f o r  naviga- 
t i o n ,  communication w i t h  a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  and how t h e  need f o r  t h i s  i n t e r -  
f e r e d  wi th  s p e c i f i c  a s p e c t s  of f l i g h t  management and c o n t r o l .  
however, w a s  a s p e c i f i c  a t t e m p t  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  kind and number of e r r o r s  
and how t h e s e  r e l a t e d  t o  o v e r a l l  workload and a r o u s a l .  The d a t a  are  now i n  an 
e a s i l y  u s a b l e  format and can be  employed f o r  any of  t h e s e  o t h e r  purposes  w i t h  
a n  economical u s e  of t i m e .  Never the less ,  a t  p r e s e n t  only t h e  d a t a  concerning 
e r r o r s ,  v i g i l a n c e  t i m e s ,  d e c i s i o n  t i m e s ,  and h e a r t  ra te  have been worked up. 
This  s t u d y ,  
E r r o r s  
Information about  t h e  e r r o r s  made by t h e  crew members w a s  ob ta ined  i n  
s e v e r a l  ways. 
by t h e  o b s e r v e r s  dur ing  t h e i r  d e b r i e f i n g  a t  t h e  end of each s e s s i o n ,  w h i l e  
some crew members, a l though n o t  ques t ioned ,  r e p o r t e d  e r r o r s  t h a t  had n o t  been 
not iced  by t h e  observers .  Addi t iona l  e r r o r s  of a l l  classes were subsequent ly  
found dur ing  examination of t h e  t r a n s c r i p t  of t h e  o b s e r v e r s '  comments onto  t h e  
s t r i p  c h a r t .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  were e r r o r s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  those  r e l a t i n g  t o  s k i l l  
and f l y i n g  technique,  t h a t  could be i d e n t i f i e d  on t h e  p r i n t o u t  of a i r c ra f t  
parameters.  The e r r o r s  were a r b i t r a r i l y  c l a s s i f i e d  as  r e l a t i n g  t o :  naviga- 
t i o n ,  communications, systems o p e r a t i o n ,  f l y i n g ,  t ac t i ca l  d e c i s i o n s ,  c r e w  
i n t e g r a t i o n ,  f l y i n g  s k i l l ,  u s e  of a u t o p i l o t ,  and o t h e r s .  
Some came from t h e  n o t e s  made by t h e  i n s t r u c t o r / o p e r a t o r  and 
The n a v i g a t i o n a l  e r r o r s  included s e l e c t i n g  t h e  wrong frequency f o r  t h e  
r e q u i r e d  NDB o r  VOR beacon, s e l e c t i n g  t h e  wrong r a d i a l  o r  heading,  f a i l i n g  t o  
select  a n a v i g a t i o n a l  f a c i l i t y  a t  t h e  c o r r e c t  t i m e ,  and misreading c h a r t s .  
(See page 38, appendix A.) 
The communication e r r o r s  a l l  concerned t h e  u s e  of r a d i o  te lephone (R/T)  
f o r  ATC purposes.  They were: s e l e c t i n g  t h e  wrong frequency,  n o t  r e p l y i n g  t o  
a clear message, misunderstanding t h e  message, u s e  of t h e  wrong ca l l  s i g n ,  and 
f o r g e t t i n g  t o  comply w i t h  a message t h a t  a crew member had p r e v i o u s l y  
acknowledged. 
The systems e r r o r s  w e r e  mainly: mishandling of engines ,  h y d r a u l i c  and 
f u e l  systems, misreading and m i s s e t t i n g  of ins t ruments ,  and f a i l u r e  t o  use ice  
p r o t e c t i o n .  (See page 4 0 ,  appendix A . )  
The m a j o r i t y  of f l y i n g  e r r o r s  involved engine handl ing,  n e g l e c t  of speed 
l i m i t s ,  and f l y i n g  a t  t h e  wrong a l t i t u d e .  Sometimes P 1  and P2 d i d  n o t  f o r -  
mal ly  hand over  t h e  c o n t r o l  of t h e  a i r c r a f t ,  and t h e s e  occurrences  were 
included under t h i s  heading. 
Most of t h e  t ac t i ca l  d e c i s i o n  e r r o r s  seen  i n  t h i s  s c e n a r i o  concerned 
t h e  amount of f u e l  t o  b e  dumped t o  achieve  a d e s i r e d  l a n d i n g  g r o s s  weight 
t h a t  would be compatible  wi th  t h e  adverse  runway c o n d i t i o n s  forced  on t h e  
f l i g h t c r e w  f o r  landing  i n  t h e  second s e c t o r .  E r r o r s  w e r e  a l s o  made con- 
c e r n i n g  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between t h e  l a n d i n g  g r o s s  weight ,  t h e  f l a p  s e t t i n g ,  
and t h e  degree of automatic  brak ing  s e l e c t e d .  
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The e r r o r s  of crew i n t e g r a t i o n  included ep isodes  where P1, f a i l i n g  t o  
r e a l i z e  t h a t  P2 o r  P3 w a s  overloaded,  asked them t o  r e t r i e v e  informat ion ,  
f u r t h e r  d i s r u p t i n g  t h e i r  performance. (See page 38,  appendix A . )  There w e r e  
workload. 
I 
I a l s o  f a i l u r e s  t o  u s e  t h e  au tomat ic  p i l o t  when t h i s  could have r e l i e v e d  t h e  
The e r r o r s  r e l a t i n g  t o  f l y i n g  s k i l l  w e r e  t hose  when t h e  p i l o t  f l y i n g  w a s  
unable  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  a i r c r a f t  t o  t h e  parameters  t h a t  he d e s i r e d ,  as d i s t i n c t  
from " f ly ing  e r r o r s "  where t h e  p i l o t  w a s  s u c c e s s f u l l y  c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  a i r c r a f t  
t o  wrong parameters .  
by 20 kno t s  w i th  t h e  a i r c r a f t  c l e a n  o r  10  kno t s  i n  t h e  approach c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
overbanking i n  a t u r n ,  f a i l i n g  t o  hold t h e  d e s i r e d  a l t i t u d e  w i t h i n  250 f t ,  
engine  handl ing  wi th  many l a r g e  and ab rup t  changes of power, r a p i d  changes of 
ang le  of a t t a c k ,  and gene ra l  rough handl ing of f l y i n g  c o n t r o l s .  
These included:  f a i l i n g  t o  main ta in  t h e  d e s i r e d  speed 
Occasions when t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  automatic  f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  w a s  n o t  used 
were c l a s s e d  as e r r o r s  when, i n  t h e  opin ion  of t h e  obse rve r ,  such u s e  would 
have m a t e r i a l l y  improved crew i n t e g r a t i o n  o r  reduced workload. 
a l s o  many occas ions  on which t h e  a c t u a l  a u t o p i l o t  c o n t r o l s  were i n c o r r e c t l y  
sequenced so t h a t  t h e  r equ i r ed  mode d i d  n o t  func t ion .  
There were 
The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  "other"  inc luded  a mixture  of even t s  such as no t  
b r i e f i n g  passengers  about  tu rbulence ,  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  o rgan iz ing  c h a r t s  and 
approach p l a t e s ,  and problems wi th  handl ing  s p e c t a c l e s .  
The numbers of t h e  v a r i o u s  classes of e r r o r s  made i n  each s e c t o r  are 
shown i n  t a b l e  3 .  The t a b l e  shows t h a t  t h e r e  w e r e  many more e r r o r s  made i n  
t h e  high workload second s e c t o r ,  a r a t i o  of about  2.5 t o  1. This  second 
s e c t o r ,  a l though about  twice as long  (mean 97 min v s  47 min),  by des ign  
conta ined  a per iod  of some 20 min dur ing  t h e  climb-out from New York i n  
which only  a low l e v e l  of a c t i v i t y  w a s  r equ i r ed ,  hence e r r o r s  would n o t  be  
expected.  This  l o w  workload per iod  w a s  needed t o  set t h e  scene  f o r  t h e  
measurement of v i g i l a n c e  f o r  t h e  subsequent abnorma l i t i e s .  
I n  view of t h e  foregoing ,  t h e  numbers of e r r o r s  were thought t o  be  a 
b e t t e r  i n d i c a t i o n  of t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  two s e c t o r s  than  e r r o r  ra te  
as a f u n c t i o n  of t i m e .  
The main d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  number of e r r o r s  made i n  t h e  two s e c t o r s  
concerns tact ical  d e c i s i o n s ,  systems ope ra t ion ,  and nav iga t ion .  Th i s  is  t o  
b e  expected because t h e  c i rcumstances  of t h e  f i r s t  s e c t o r  r equ i r ed  few 
d e c i s i o n s ,  whereas many had t o  be  made i n  t h e  second. S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  t h e  
second s e c t o r  t h e  engine shutdown and consequent dumping procedures  provided 
t h e  oppor tun i ty  f o r  more e r r o r s  i n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  of systems. The need t o  
t u r n  back i n  t h e  second s e c t o r  involved nav iga t ion  t h a t  had n o t  been planned 
be fo re  f l i g h t ;  t h i s  induced t h e  known d i f f i c u l t i e s  consequent on d i v e r s i o n  
t o  another  a i r p o r t .  
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The Significance of the Errors 
I 
Most of the errors significant for safe flight or for airline economics 
can be found under the headings of navigation, systems operation flying, 
and tactical decisions. All the errors in these categories were referred to 
a senior member of the training staff of the participating airline. 




Omitted turning point. 
VOR/ADF switch set to ADF at takeoff. 
Both the VOR/ADF switches set to ADF for 21 min after takeoff. 
Tuned wrong outer marker at JFK. 
Used wrong VOR to identify Swanpoint intersection. 
Most fixes and turning points missed by 10 mi. 
Second Sectors 
Wrong frequency selected for Bridgeport VOR. 
Unable to locate the VOR on the cluttered chart. Had to go to 
Missed Cambridge VOR by 18 mi. 
Used the 061 radial of Bridgeport VOR instead of Kennedy VOR. 
Forgot to hold at Bohemia. 
Commenced climb before clearance from ATC. 
Went through Bohemia hold by 4 min ( 2 4  mi). 
Went through the Bohemia hold by 23 mi. 
Inserted the wrong way-point in inertial navigational system when 
P1 misunderstood the standard instrument departure. 
approach plate. 
due to an error in subtraction. 
Also made a serious heading mistake 
calculating distance and deduced a wrong position. 
Systems Operation 
First Sectors 
No ice protection used at takeoff, therefore malfunction of EPR 
gauges; P3 throttled back without referring to other instruments. 
Aircraft slowed to stick-shake speed. 
P2 used the wrong flight director computer. 
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Ice protection not used for takeoff and therefore EPR gauges 
P2 used the wrong air data computer for flight director. 
Altimeter setting error of 150 ft. 
Second Sectors 
malfunctioned. P3 throttled back. 
Engine was overboosted to 1.89 EPR. 
Engines overboosted (EGT warning lights). 
P3 did not see the hydraulic leak for 5 min and then only when the 
"empty" light went on. 
P1 had the storm lights on and P3 had the warning lights set on 
dim. Consequently the engine oil low pressure lights were not 
seen. 
P3 only dumped the fuel from the inboard tanks and prolonged the 
One engine overboosted several times to 1.54 EPR. 
Incorrect fuel dump resulting in unbalanced main tanks. 
P3 made an error of 100,000 lb when dumping fuel. 
Engines overboosted several times, max EPR 2.07. 
Engines overboosted to 1.51 EPR. Engine not throttled back for 
dump unnecessarily. 
5 min after oil clog noticed. 
P2 crossed over air data computers to try to solve a flight director 
discrepancy. This was illogical. 
Flying Errors 
First Sectors 
Activated ground proximity warning system twice during approach. 
Indicated airspeed 326 knots at 9,000 ft. (250 knot limit below 
10,000 ft). 
Second Sectors 
Slow in the holding pattern with an angle of attack of 6.7" with the 
aircraft clean; indicated airspeed was 15 knots below minimum 
for this configuration. 
Indicated airspeed 20 knots below book speed for height and all up 
weight. 
Continued the dump in a 45" banked turn. 
500 ft below the cleared altitude of 4,000 ft. 
Flew at Mach number 0.86, which equals the limiting 'mo. 
Los t  1,000 f t  a f t e r  s h u t t i n g  down No. 2 engine.  A l s o  had i n d i c a t e d  
a i r s p e e d  of 215 kno t s  w i t h  t h e  a i r c r a f t  c l e a n  du r ing  t h e  hold a t  
Bohemia ( 2 0  kno t s  low).  
of 2,500 f t .  
Misunderstood t h e  d e p a r t u r e  c l ea rance .  Exceeded c l e a r e d  a l t i t u d e  
I Tactical Decis ions  
F i r s t  S e c t o r s  
P 1  f a i l e d  t o  t a k e  over  du r ing  u n s t a b l e  approach. 
Second S e c t o r s  
Dumping s t a r t e d  ve ry  la te ,  24 min a f t e r  engine  shutdown. 
Cor rec t  l and ing  g r o s s  weight 564,000 l b .  Seven crews decided 
P 1  s e l e c t e d  maximum automat ic  brak ing .  
Decided 30 f l a p  f o r  approach wi thout  checking T page (by two crews).  
Decis ion  t o  r e t u r n  t o  JFK made wi thout  cons ide r ing  o t h e r  n e a r e r  
P 1  accepted  a l t i t u d e  change t o  35,000 f t  by ATC. Imposs ib le  a t  
585,000 l b .  
a l t e r n a t e s  by n i n e  of t h e  e igh teen  crews. 
t h a t  weight.  
The s c e n a r i o s  of bo th  t h e  low and h igh  workload s e c t o r s  induced e r r o r s  
t h a t  w e r e  comparable i n  number and kind t o  those  which had been p rev ious ly  
observed i n  f l i g h t .  The average  number of t o t a l  e r r o r s  made i n  t h e  h igh  
workload s e c t o r  w a s  comparable t o  those  r epor t ed  f o r  a European a i r l i n e  i n  
h igh  workload s e c t o r s  i n  1971  ( s e e  t a b l e  4 ) .  This  s i m i l a r i . t y  suppor t s  t h e  
c r e d i b i l i t y  of t h e  s c e n a r i o s  and s i m u l a t i o n  techniques  used i n  t h i s  s tudy .  
Usual ly  e r r o r s  t h a t  p e r s i s t e d  long  enough t o  produce s e r i o u s  e f f e c t s  w e r e  
no d i f f e r e n t  from those  t h a t  were picked up as soon as they  were made. Th i s  
p e r s i s t e n c e  h i g h l i g h t s  t h e  importance of e f f e c t i v e  moni tor ing  by a l l  crew 
members. Because of t h e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  i t  seemed worthwhile t o  t r y  t o  f i n d  
o u t  how v a r i o u s  classes of e r r o r  came about .  There w a s  a g r e a t  amount of 
d e t a i l e d  informat ion  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  a l l  t h e  c i rcumstances  preceding  t h e  
s i g n i f i c a n t  e r r o r s ,  and an  a t t empt  w a s  made t o  re la te  some of t h e  more 
s i g n i f i c a n t  e r r o r s  t o  t h e  c i rcumstances  t h a t  preceded them. 
Where p o s s i b l e ,  i t  w a s  thought a d v i s a b l e  t o  reexamine t h e  f l i g h t  deck 
c i rcumstances  f o r  a per iod  of some 1 5  min b e f o r e  t h e  e r r o r  w a s  made and t o  
con t inue  t h i s  u n t i l  t h e  e r r o r  w a s  noted and c o r r e c t e d  o r  w a s  no longe r  of any 
s i g n i f i c a n c e .  Thus t h e  l e n g t h  of pos t even t  s tudy  w a s  v a r i a b l e .  A l l  t h e  
d i f f e r e n t  k inds  of r eco rds  were used;  t h e  ATC cmmunica t ion  and t h e  cockp i t  
v o i c e  r eco rd ings  were loca ted  and t r a n s c r i b e d ,  as were t h e  o b s e r v e r ' s  
comments. This  procedure w a s  needed because i n  some cases a l l  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  
in fo rma t ion  had n o t  been noted du r ing  t h e  i n i t i a l  simultaneous t r a n s c r i p t i o n  
1 9  
TABLE 4 . -  ERROR RATES I N  HIGH WORKLOAD 
Runs/ 
F l i g h t s  Sec to r  
Mean Standard Avg. f l i g h t  Er ror  
e r r o r s  dev ia t ion  time (min) ra te /min  
JFK and 




18 18.2 6.2 97 0.19 
G 1  as gow 
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t h a t  has  been p rev ious ly  descr ibed .  The computer p r i n t o u t  f o r  t h e  a i r c r a f t  
parameters  w a s  a l s o  examined i n  d e t a i l  f o r  t h e  same pe r iod .  
From t h e  v a r i o u s  sou rces ,  i t  w a s  p o s s i b l e  a c c u r a t e l y  t o  r e c o n s t r u c t  
t h e  f l i g h t  pa th  t o  show t h e  e f f e c t  of n a v i g a t i o n a l  e r r o r s ,  t o  q u a n t i f y  t h e  
e r o s i o n  of s a f e t y  margins i n  such th ings  as  a n g l e  of a t t a c k  and speed limits 
f o r  a i r c r a f t  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s ,  as w e l l  as t o  v e r i f y  t h e  v i o l a t i o n s  of a i r  t r a f -  
f i c  c o n t r o l  speed l i m i t s  and t h e  o v e r s t r e s s i n g  of power p l a n t s .  I n  some 
cases, t h e r e f o r e ,  i t  w a s  p o s s i b l e  n o t  on ly  t o  see how t h e  e r r o r s  came t o  b e  
made b u t  a l s o  how they a f f e c t e d  t h e  conduct of t h e  f l i g h t .  
I n  many cases, e s p e c i a l l y  where t h e  e r r o r s  were l a r g e ,  t h e  obse rve r s  
An example of were a b l e  t o  recall  many of t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  c i rcumstances.  
t h i s  w a s  a n  occas ion  when P1 and P2 were d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  l o c a t i o n  of a naviga- 
t i o n a l  f a c i l i t y  and spread o u t  c h a r t s  so  t h a t  no t  on ly  w a s  t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  
concent ra ted  on t h i s  problem, bu t  a l s o  t h e  c h a r t  i n  u s e  w a s  placed s o  t h a t  i t  
p h y s i c a l l y  obscured t h e  P l s  f l i g h t  ins t rument  pane l .  Almost c e r t a i n l y  t h i s  
w a s  t h e  reason  t h e  VOR t o  which they were homing w a s  overflown by many m i l e s .  
The most s i g n i f i c a n t  e r r o r s  concerned t h e  landing  g ross  weight  (LGW), 
nav iga t ion ,  and engine handl ing.  The LGW is  important  because,  i f  it i s  too  
h igh  i t  can  a f f e c t  t h e  maneuver margins on t h e  approach and a l s o  t h e  a b i l i t y  
t o  s t o p  s a f e l y  i n  the  a v a i l a b l e  runway l e n g t h  wi th  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  wind and 
s u r f a c e  cond i t ions .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i f  too much f u e l  has  been dumped, 
t h e  cho ice  of a l t e r n a t e  a i r f i e l d s  may be  l i m i t e d .  
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Naviga t iona l  e r r o r s  have s p e c i a l  importance i n  areas wi th  heavy t r a f f i c  
such as t h e  New York Metroplex t h a t  forms a l a r g e  p a r t  of t h e  area i n  which 
t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t s  of t h i s  s c e n a r i o  t a k e  p l ace .  On t h r e e  occas ions  t h e  
inbound l e g  of t h e  hold a t  Bohemia w a s  prolonged, once f o r  23 m i .  Under 
a c t u a l  f l i g h t  o p e r a t i o n s ,  an  e r r o r  of t h i s  magnitude would b e  u n l i k e l y  because 
i t  would almost  c e r t a i n l y  be  seen  on t h e  r a d a r  by t h e  r e l e v a n t  a i r  t r a f f i c  
c o n t r o l l e r .  
Engine handl ing  can a f f e c t  s a f e t y ,  f o r  example, i f  power is  reduced 
immediately a f t e r  t akeof f .  This  happened on t h r e e  occas ions  because of f a u l t y  
i n d i c a t i o n s  due t o  i c i n g  of t h e  PR probes.  Furthermore,  overboos t ing  of 
engines  may l i m i t  t h e i r  l i f e  o r  l e a d  t o  subsequent f a i l u r e s .  Seve ra l  i n c i d e n t s  
of t h i s  k ind  w e r e  seen.  
Examples of workups of each of t h e s e  c a t e g o r i e s  of e r r o r  are shown i n  
appendix A. Although the  number of e r r o r s  whose o r i g i n s  and e f f e c t s  have 
been r econs t ruc t ed  i n  t h i s  way i s  too  s m a l l  f o r  s ta t i s t ica l  purposes ,  i t  does 
show how inc reased  u s e  might be  made of t h e  d a t a  a v a i l a b l e  i n  c rash-surv ivable  
r e c o r d e r s  f o r  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of a c c i d e n t s .  These d a t a  can  be  used t o  
improve t h e  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  of cockp i t  ac t iv i t ies  dur ing  a s imula t ion  of t h e  
c i rcumstances  preceding a n  acc iden t .  The u s e  of c u r r e n t  l i n e  crews provided 
wi th  t h e  f l i g h t  p l a n  and o t h e r  paper work f o r  t h e  t r i p  and t h e  i n c l u s i o n  of 
t h e  ATC communication and nav iga t ion  workload might i n c r e a s e  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of 
t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  s o  t h a t  t h e  causes  of obscure a c c i d e n t s  might be  brought  t o  
l i g h t  more e a s i l y .  
Relevance of E r ro r  Recording f o r  T ra in ing  
The kfnd of s c e n a r i o  and record ing  techniques used i n  t h i s  s tudy  demon- 
s t r a t e d  t o  t h e  vo lun tee r  aircrews and t r a i n i n g  personnel  how easy i t  is  f o r  
e r r o r s  t o  be  made i n  h igh  workload s i t u a t i o n s .  This  has  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  
t r a i n i n g .  Many of t h e  d i s c r e t e  e r r o r s  and wrong d e c i s i o n s  w e r e  r e l a t e d  t o  
over loading  one p a r t i c u l a r  crew member, p a r t i c u l a r l y  when he  w a s  engaged i n  
r e c i t i n g  and complying wi th  c h e c k l i s t s  f o r  t h e  procedures  connected wi th  
abnormal ope ra t ion .  It w a s  a l s o  seen how i n  some c a s e s  compliance wi th  t h e s e  
procedures  could i n t e r f e r e  wi th  t h e  monitor ing cover b u i l t  i n t o  s t anda rd  
o p e r a t i n g  procedures .  
The realism of t h e  c i rcumstances ,  coupled wi th  a b i l i t y  t o  r e f e r  i n s t a n t l y  
t o  t h e  p r i n t o u t  of t h e  a i r c r a f t  parameters  a t  t h e  end of a run,  seemed t o  
have a marked impact on t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  c r e w .  This  e f f e c t  might be  
heightened i f  record ings  of t h e  cockp i t  conve r sa t ion  and communication wi th  
ATC could a l s o  be  rep layed  du r ing  r e t r o s p e c t i v e  assessments .  
Vig i lance  
Vig i l ance  is  a n  important  c o n s t i t u e n t  of a i rmanship and t h e  s c e n a r i o  
w a s  designed s o  t h a t  t h e  crew's v i g i l a n c e  could be a s ses sed .  
t r a n s c r i p t s  of t h e  o b s e r v e r ' s  comments and t h e  "cockpi t  voice" channels  t h a t  
By means of t h e  
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w e r e  w r i t t e n  on t h e  s t r i p  c h a r t ,  i t  w a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  measure t h e  t i m e  t aken  
t o  n o t i c e  t h e  r ise i n  f i l t e r  p r e s s u r e  on t h e  o i l  p r e s s u r e  gauge o r  t h e  
subsequent o i l  p r e s s u r e  warning l i g h t  f o r  No. 2 engine ,  fo l lowing  t h e  simula- 
t i o n  of t h e  f i l t e r  c log .  The time taken  t o  n o t i c e  t h e  d e p l e t i o n  of t h e  f l u i d  
i n  N o .  3 h y d r a u l i c  system w a s  measured i n  t h e  same way. With c a r e ,  t h e s e  
t i m e s  could be  a s ses sed  t o  +1 sec .  
The t i m e s  f o r  t h e  two s i t u a t i o n s  show a l a r g e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  
s h o r t e s t  and l o n g e s t  ( t a b l e  5 ) .  Except f o r  Run 1 0 ,  i n  which t h e  aud io  record-  
i ng  mal func t ioned ,  t h e  t i m e  f o r  t h e  l i g h t  t o  be seen  by t h e  crew v a r i e d  from 
3 t o  155 sec .  P1 w a s  f i r s t  t o  n o t i c e  t h i s  l i g h t  on 13  o u t  of t he  1 7  runs  f o r  
which t h i s  in format ion  w a s  a v a i l a b l e ,  probably because t h e  warning pane l  is 
near P l ' s  f l i g h t  i n s t rumen t s .  
The t i m e  taken t o  n o t i c e  t h e  d e p l e t i o n  of t h e  h y d r a u l i c  f l u i d  i n  No. 3 
system w a s  a l s o  v a r i a b l e ;  t h e  hydrau l i c  l i g h t  w a s  f i r s t  seen  by P3  on 13 of 
t h e  17 r u n s ,  by P 1  on 3 and once by P 1  and P3 s imul taneous ly .  
expected because t h e  h y d r a u l i c  gauge is  toward t h e  a f t  end of t h e  systems 
monitoring pane l ,  forming p a r t  of t h e  P3's work s t a t i o n .  
P2 and only  wi th  d i f f i c u l t y  by P1.  
This  can  be  
It cannot be  seen  by 
An a t t empt  w a s  made t o  relate t h e  t i m e  t aken  t o  n o t i c e  t h e  problems w i t h  
t h e  preceding  s t a t e  of a r o u s a l  i n d i c a t e d  by t h e  pe rcen tage  of r ise i n  h e a r t -  
r a t e  of each c r e w  member o r  t o  t h e  sum of t h e  i n c r e a s e s  of a l l  t h r e e .  N o  such 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  could be found (appendix B ) .  
Dec is ion  T i m e s  
Because of t h e  clogged o i l  f i l t e r  f o r  No. 2 engine ,  many d e c i s i o n s  had t o  
be made by t h e  c a p t a i n .  F ive  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  examples t h a t  could  e a s i l y  be  
timed w e r e  s e l e c t e d  f o r  measurement. They were: ( a )  t o  s h u t  down t h e  engine ,  
(b) t o  r e t u r n  t o  Kennedy, ( c )  t o  dump f u e l ,  (d) t o  s tar t  t h e  dump, and (e)  t o  
make t h e  t u r n  onto  t h e  f i r s t  n a v i g a t i o n  f a c i l i t y  on t h e  way back. A l l  t h e  
t i m e s  were taken  from when t h e  o i l  p r e s s u r e  warning l i g h t  w a s  f i r s t  n o t i c e d  
by any member of t h e  crew. The i n t e r v a l s  were obta ined  from t h e  r eco rd ings  of 
t h e  cockp i t  v o i c e  and communications and where r e l e v a n t ,  were v e r i f i e d  by 
r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  p r i n t o u t  of a i r c r a f t  parameters  ( t a b l e  6 ) .  
There i s  a wide v a r i a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  t i m e  and o r d e r  t o  make d e c i s i o n s  
( t a b l e  7 ) .  The d i f f e r e n c e  i n  sequence may r e f l e c t  t h e  menta l  p rocesses  used 
by t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c a p t a i n s  t o  assess t h e  p r i o r i t i e s  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  
An a t t empt  w a s  made t o  a s s o c i a t e  t h e  t i m e s  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  of t h e  
d e c i s i o n s  wi th  a r o u s a l  as i n d i c a t e d  by h e a r t  rate.  These r ead ings  w e r e  t aken  
from t h e  readout  of h e a r t  ra te  on t h e  s t r i p  c h a r t  20 s e c  p r i o r  t o  t h e  t i m e  
t h e  d e c i s i o n s  were recorded .  
t h e  lowest recorded r ead ing  f o r  t h a t  s u b j e c t .  A s t a t i s t i c a l  s tudy  of t h e s e  
r e s u l t s  (appendix B) r evea led  no r e l a t i o n s h i p  except  t h a t  d e c i s i o n  t i m e  w a s  
a f f e c t e d  by whether P 1  w a s  " f ly ing"  o r  n o t  " f ly ing , "  and t h i s  parameter 
always i n f l u e n c e s  h e a r t  ra te .  
These d a t a  were converted t o  pe rcen tage  rise over 
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TABLE 6.- DECISION TIMES AFTER OIL "P" DIFFERENTIAL SEEN 
I N  SECOND SECTORS 













1 2  
1 3  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
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214 
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1 0 3  2 
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1 0 3 1  
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832 
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TABLE 7.- CLOGGED OIL FILTER, NO. 2 ENGINE - ORDER OF DECISIONS 
Run 
1, 5, 6 ,  7 ,  9 
1 2 ,  13 ,  14 
3 and 11 
8 and 1 6  
2 
4 
1 0  
1 5  
1 7  





t o  NYC 
B 
Decide t o  
dump f u e l  
C 
S t a r t  t h e  
dump 
D 




Heart R a t e  
Sampling- The h e a r t - r a t e  d a t a  were sampled v i s u a l l y  from t h e  pen r eco rde r  
t r a c i n g s  every 100 sec f o r  each of t h e  c r e w  members throughout bo th  s e c t o r s  
of every run.  I n  t h e  uneven t fu l  f i r s t  segments, t h e s e  r ead ings  w e r e  averaged 
f o r  t h e  whole f l i g h t  except  f o r  t h e  2-min pe r iods  immediately fo l lowing  take-  
o f f  and preceding  landings .  I n  t h e  high workload second s e c t o r s ,  t h e  r ead ings  
were averaged f o r  t h a t  p o r t i o n  of t h e  f l i g h t  p r i o r  t o  t h e  o i l  f i l t e r  c log  of 
No. 2 engine  and a g a i n  f o r  t h a t  p o r t i o n  of t h e  f l i g h t  fo l lowing  t h e  c log .  
Spot checks of h e a r t  rates were a l s o  taken  from t h e  t r a c i n g s  20 sec p r i o r  
The h i g h e s t  v a l u e s  of h e a r t  rate immediately fo l lowing  takeoff  and dur- 
t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  t o  s h u t  down t h e  engine ,  t o  r e t u r n  t o  New York, and t o  dump 
f u e l .  
ing the  approach were found f o r  bo th  s e c t o r s  of each run ,  as w e r e  t h e  h i g h e s t  
v a l u e s  immediately a f t e r  l and ing .  
Signi f icance of the  heart rate-  To compare h e a r t  rates among s u b j e c t s ,  
i t  w a s  decided t h a t  a l l  t h e  h e a r t - r a t e  v a l u e s  should be  expressed as a 
percentage  rise over  t h e  lowest  recorded du r ing  t h e i r  " p r e f l i g h t "  t i m e  i n  t h e  
s imula to r .  The average  percentage  rises i n  h e a r t  rate f o r  a l l  of t h e  s u b j e c t s  
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i n  every  phase of t h e  18 runs  are shown i n  f i g u r e  2. There i s  l i t t l e  d i f f e r -  
ence between t h e  mean percentage  rise dur ing  takeoff  f o r  t h e  low and h igh  
workload s e c t o r s ;  f o r  approach and l and ing ,  however, t h e  mean rise i n  t h e  
second s e c t o r  i s  h i g h e r ;  t h i s  is  a lmost  c e r t a i n l y  due t o  t h e  need f o r  a manual, 
i n s t rumen t ,  three-engine approach i n  a s t r o n g  crosswind. 
t h a t  i n  t h e  second s e c t o r ,  du r ing  t h e  uneven t fu l  climbout b e f o r e  t h e  o n s e t  of 
problems, t h e  pe rcen tage  r ise i n  t h e  h e a r t  r a t e  i s  lower than  a t  any o t h e r  
time. These r e s u l t s  are a l s o  similar t o  those  t h a t  have been seen  i n  f l i g h t  
du r ing  o t h e r  s t u d i e s .  
It w i l l  a l s o  be  seen  
Assoc ia t ions  were sought between t h e  mean percentage  r ise  i n  h e a r t  ra te  
f o r  P1,  P2 and P3 i n d i v i d u a l l y  as w e l l  as f o r  t h e  c r e w  as a whole. A complete 
l i s t  of t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  made w i t h  r ega rd  t o  p o s s i b l e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  between 
h e a r t  ra te ,  e r r o r s ,  v i g i l a n c e  and d e c i s i o n  t i m e s  i s  shown i n  appendix B.  
There w a s  a s t r o n g  a s s o c i a t i o n  between a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  h e a r t  rate of 
bo th  P1 and P2 when they  w e r e  t h e  " f ly ing"  p i l o t  f o r  t h a t  s e c t o r .  
t r u e  f o r  a l l  phases  of t a k e o f f ,  c r u i s e ,  approach, and l and ing  ( f i g .  2 ) .  This  
f i n d i n g  w a s  comparable wi th  obse rva t ions  made i n  f l i g h t  by t h e  au tho r  and 
o t h e r s  du r ing  scheduled a i r l i n e  o p e r a t i o n  ( r e f s .  1 and 2). 
This  w a s  
The l a c k  of e f f e c t  of a r o u s a l ,  as i n d i c a t e d  by h e a r t  rate, on v i g i l a n c e  
o r  t h e  number of e r r o r s  w a s  unexpected. Th i s  f i n d i n g  may suppor t  t h e  conten- 
t i o n  t h a t  h e a r t  rate by i t s e l f  should n o t  be  used as  a measure of workload i n  
complex s i t u a t i o n s .  
Performance 
The wide v a r i e t y  of a i r c r a f t  parameters a v a i l a b l e  on t h e  p r i n t o u t  p rov ides  
a n  oppor tun i ty  f o r  measuring t h e  f l y i n g  performance of t h e  p i l o t s  i n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  f l y i n g  s k i l l ,  nav iga t ion ,  and compliance wi th  a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  i n s t r u c -  
t i o n s .  When t h e  experiment w a s  f i r s t  set up i t  w a s  cons idered  d e s i r a b l e  t h a t  
p r o v i s i o n  be  made t o  measure d e v i a t i o n s  i n  azimuth and from t h e  g l i d e  s l o p e  
wh i l e  p i l o t s  performed a manual ins t rument  approach wi th  r e f e r e n c e  t o  ILS .  
Th i s  i n d i c a t o r  of s k i l l  w a s  chosen-because  i t  had p rev ious ly  been used by 
B i l l i n g s  e t  a l .  ( r e f s .  3 and 4 )  t o  show t h e  e f f e c t s  of v a r i o u s  stresses 
( e . g . ,  h igh  blood a l c o h o l )  on t h e  a b i l i t y  of p i l o t s  t o  perform t h e i r  t a s k s .  
Informat ion  i s  a v a i l a b l e  on t h e  p r i n t o u t s  f o r  a n  assessment of t h i s  kind 
t o  be  made, bu t  i t  w a s  decided n o t  t o  do t h i s  because t h e  d a t a  are n o t  a v a i l -  
a b l e  on magnetic t a p e  i n  d i g i t a l  form and t h e  p r i n t o u t  f i g u r e s  would r e q u i r e  
e x t e n s i v e  manipula t ion  b e f o r e  meaningful s c o r e s  could  be  worked o u t .  Fur ther -  
more, i t  had been no t i ced  du r ing  t h e  s imula to r  runs  t h a t  bo th  Pl's and P2's 
w e r e  a b l e  t o  c a r r y  o u t  p r e c i s e  approaches on t h e  ILS  and t h a t  t h e i r  performance 
w a s  no t  a t  a l l  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  foregoing  stress and h igh  workload. Neverthe- 
less, t h e  d a t a  are  a v a i l a b l e  should v e r i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  a u t h o r ' s  op in ion  be  
needed i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  
The impress ion  w a s  gained t h a t  performance w a s  adve r se ly  a f f e c t e d  by 
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Figure  2.- Percentage rise i n  h e a r t  r a t e  v e r s u s  lowest  recorded p r e f l i g h t  
( P 1  and P2 f l y i n g  and n o t  f l y i n g  - hatched b a r s  denote  "not f l y i n g " ) .  
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c l e a r a n c e s  and o t h e r  ATC messages. Those i n d i v i d u a l s  who recognized t h a t  they  
had t h i s  problem wrote  down a l l  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  f i g u r e s  and l o c a t i o n s  b e f o r e  
acknowledging t h e  t r ansmiss ion .  
Long-term memory problems were a l s o  encountered. For i n s t a n c e ,  s e v e r a l  
crew members had d i f f i c u l t y  i n  r e c a l l i n g  informat ion  gained du r ing  t r a i n i n g  
about  a i r c r a f t  systems. This  problem w a s  more p r e v a l e n t  i n  those  who had been 
, f l y i n g  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  a i r c r a f t  type f o r  a long t i m e .  
I Resource Management 
The need f o r  extremely competent a i r l i n e  c a p t a i n s  i s  recognized by t h e  
r i g o r  of t h e i r  s e l e c t i o n  t h a t  i n c l u d e s  a requirement f o r  long  exper ience  i n  
commercial f l y i n g .  They are rewarded by t h i s  p o s i t i o n  of g r e a t  a u t h o r i t y .  
The main requi rements  f o r  s u c c e s s f u l  cap ta incy  have, however, n o t  been s p e l l e d  
o u t  nor is  t h i s  t h e  p l a c e  f o r  such a complete l ist .  For t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  t h i s  
experiment provided o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t o  observe  18 d i f f e r e n t  c a p t a i n s  as they  
responded t o  t h e  demands of t h e  same abnormal f l i g h t  c o n d i t i o n s .  There seemed 
t o  be  l a r g e  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  r e s p e c t  t o  l e a d e r s h i p ,  r e s o u r c e  management and 
decisionmaking. Though t h e s e  a t t r i b u t e s  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  q u a n t i f y ,  i t  w a s  
p o s s i b l e  t o  observe  and r eco rd  d i f f e r e n c e s  between crews w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  a l l  
I 
I of them. 
In  some of t h e  runs  l e a d e r s h i p  q u a l i t y  seemed l a c k i n g  and on occas ion  P2 I 
I appeared t o  have usurped t h e  r o l e  of P1. Resource management relates t o  both  t h e  human and material a d j u n c t s  a v a i l -  
a b l e  t o  t h e  c a p t a i n .  T h i s  a b i l i t y  i s  more e a s i l y  q u a n t i f i e d ;  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i t  
is  p o s s i b l e  t o  observe  t h e  ways i n  which informat ion  f o r  s o l v i n g  t h e  problems 
posed by t h e  s c e n a r i o  is obta ined .  Large d i f f e r e n c e s  were seen ,  va ry ing  from 
t h e  met icu lous  conf i rma t ion  of remembered informat ion  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  docu- 
ments, t o  t h e  u s e  of preconceived v a l u e s  t h a t  were n o t  checked. I n  some r u n s  
t h i s  kind of behavior  l e d  t o  t h e  need f o r  l a t e  r e a p p r a i s a l  and changes i n  
d e c i s i o n s ,  t h u s  pro longing  f l i g h t  time and i n c r e a s i n g  workload a t  c r i t i c a l  
I s t a g e s  of f l i g h t .  
Sometimes, w h i l e  t h e  crew w a s  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  b e s t  cour se  of a c t i o n  among 
themselves,  i t  w a s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  de te rmine  whether P 1  o r  P2 w a s  i n  c o n t r o l  of 
t h e  a i r c r a f t  even a t  times when no a u t o p i l o t  w a s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  use .  
behavior  w a s  most o f t e n  no t i ced  when e i t h e r  P 1  o r  P2 w a s  s e a r c h i n g  e i t h e r  a 
c h a r t  o r  approach p l a t e  f o r  n a v i g a t i o n a l  f i x e s  and t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  r a d i o  
f r equenc ie s  and sought h e l p  i n  t h i s  from t h e  f l y i n g  p i l o t .  
This  
Another f a c e t  of poor u t i l i z a t i o n  of human r e s o u r c e s  w a s  t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  
a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  over loading  of a crew member by c e r t a i n  combinations of 
c i rcumstances .  An example of t h i s  w a s  t h e  l a c k  of r e c o g n i t i o n  by some P l ' s  
of t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of t h e  d e p l e t i o n  of t h e  f l u i d  i n  No. 3 h y d r a u l i c  system. 
With t h i s  they l o s t  t h e  remaining a u t o p i l o t .  Th i s  i nc reased  t h e  workload i n  a 
way some P l ' s  d i d  n o t  r e a l i z e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  when they were t h e  p i l o t  " f ly ing"  
I f o r  t h a t  s e c t o r  and when some of them continued t o  hand-fly t h e  a i r c r a f t  
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themselves as w e l l  as t o  make d e c i s i o n s .  When Pl's were aware of t h e  s i t u a -  
t i o n  and de lega ted  t h e i r  P2's t o  c o n t r o l l i n g  the  a i r c r a f t  i n  i t s  f l i g h t  pa th ,  
immediate b e n e f i t s  were ev iden t .  Great d i f f e r e n c e s  were a l s o  evid,ent i n  t h e  
way i n  which d e c i s i o n s  were a r r i v e d  a t  by P l ' s  fo l lowing  t h e  c l o g  of t h e  o i l  
f i l t e r  of No. 2 engine because then  he w a s  a b l e  t o  g ive  f u l l  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
a s s i m i l a t i n g  t h e  informat ion  from documents, ATC, and o t h e r  c r e w  members and 
f 
' t o  use t h e s e  d a t a  t o  make unhurr ied dec i s ions .  
Some of  t h e  c a p t a i n s  apprec i a t ed  t h e  abnormal s i t u a t i o n  qu ick ly ,  and 
w i t h i n  seconds had r e a l i z e d  t h e  need t o  s h u t  down t h e  engine ,  which would 
r e q u i r e  permission from ATC f o r  a lower a l t i t u d e .  
t h e  need t o  land  a t  t h e  n e a r e s t  s u i t a b l e  a i r f i e l d  and began t o  assemble t h e  
informat ion  about  weather and runway cond i t ions  t h a t  would enable  them t o  work 
out  t h e  c o r r e c t  l and ing  g r o s s  weight and how much f u e l  they needed t o  dump. 
They immediately r e a l i z e d  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e r e  were occas ions  when t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  shu t  down 
t h e  engine w a s  delayed f o r  s e v e r a l  minutes  and a f t e r  t h i s ,  v a i n  a t t empt s  w e r e  
made t o  ma in ta in  a l t i t u d e  a t  t h e  expense of speed o r  overboos t ing  t h e  remain- 
i n g  engines .  I n  some cases t h e  landing  g ross  weight  w a s  subsumed wi thout  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  informat ion  concerning t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  l and ing  runway. 
I n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
Many of t h e  d a t a  were examined s t a t i s t i c a l l y  i n  an  a t tempt  t o  f i n d  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between v a r i o u s  sets of r e s u l t s .  A d e t a i l e d  account  of t h i s  
s tudy  i s  i n  appendix B. I n  summary, t h e  fo l lowing  sets of d a t a  were examined: 
Those concerned wi th  changes i n  t h e  cond i t ion  of s u b j e c t s  i n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  t h e  t i m e  and p l a c e  of t h e  experiment:  
1. T i m e  of day of s imula t ion  s e s s i o n  ve r sus  t o t a l  e r r o r s  i n  S e c t o r s  1 
and 2. 
2.  Hours ou t  of bed b e f o r e  s ta r t  of s imula to r  run  ve r sus  t o t a l  e r r o r s  
i n  S e c t o r s  1 and 2. 
3 .  Days s i n c e  l as t  f l i g h t  ve r sus  t o t a l  e r r o r s  i n  S e c t o r s  1 and 2. 
Those concerned wi th  e f f e c t  of age of p i l o t s :  
1. Age ve r sus  percentage  rise of h e a r t  ra te  a t  takeoff  f o r  P 1  and P2 
when f l y i n g  and n o t  f l y i n g  f o r  S e c t o r s  1 and 2. 
2. Age v e r s u s  percentage  r i se  of  h e a r t  rate a t  approach;  P1 and P2, 
f l y i n g  and n o t  f l y i n g  f o r  S e c t o r s  1 and 2. 
3 .  Age v e r s u s  percentage  rise of h e a r t  rate dur ing  l and ing ;  P1 and P2, 
f l y i n g  and no t  f l y i n g  f o r  Sec to r s  1 and 2.  
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Those concerned w i t h  e f f e c t s  of a r o u s a l  as i n d i c a t e d  by percentage  r ise 
of h e a r t  ra te  i n  r e l a t i o n  to :  
1. Number of errors versus  percentage r i se  i n  h e a r t  r a t e  throughout 
S e c t o r s  1 and 2. 
2. T i m e  taken t o  n o t i c e  c logging of o i l  f i l t e r  v e r s u s  r i se  i n  mean 
h e a r t  r a t e  f o r  t h e  prev ious  p a r t  of Sec tor  2. 
3 .  T i m e  t o  n o t i c e  d e p l e t i o n  of No. 3 h y d r a u l i c  system v e r s u s  percentage  
r ise i n  mean h e a r t  ra te  f o r  t h e  per iod  immediately a f t e r  t h e  clogged o i l  f i l t e r  
i n  Sec tor  No. 2. 
4 .  T i m e  t o  make d e c i s i o n s  v e r s u s  percentage  rise i n  h e a r t  r a t e  a f t e r  
n o t i c i n g  o i l  p r e s s u r e  l i g h t  f o r  No. 2 engine.  (The d e c i s i o n s  being (1) t o  
shu t  down No. 2 engine,  (2) t o  r e t u r n  t o  New York, and ( 3 )  t o  d e c i d e  t o  dump 
f u e l . )  
The most s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  found f o r  any of t h e  r e s u l t s  w a s  t h a t  
concerning t h e  percentage  r ise  i n  h e a r t  r a t e  f o r  t h e  p i l o t s  a t  t h e  c o n t r o l s ,  
which w a s  always g r e a t e r  than t h a t  f o r  t h e  p i l o t  n o t  a t  t h e  control’s.  This  
held good f o r  a l l  phases  of f l i g h t  i n  both  t h e  low and h igh  workload s e c t o r s .  
The percentage  r ise  i n  h e a r t  ra te  of t h e  P3 d u r i n g  t h e  per iod  i n  S e c t o r  2 
I p r i o r  t o  t h e  o n s e t  of t h e  engine problem a l s o  seemed r e l a t e d  t o  e r r o r s  made 
i n  t h e  second s e c t o r ,  t h e  number of e r r o r s  i n c r e a s i n g  w i t h  t h e  rise i n  h e a r t  
ra te .  
There i s  a l s o  a r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  number of e r r o r s  made i n  t h e  
f i r s t  s e c t o r  and t h e  number of days s i n c e  t h e  l as t  f l i g h t  of P1 and P3; t h i s  
does n o t  hold t r u e  f o r  P2. There i s  less c o r r e l a t i o n  between t h e  number of 
e r r o r s  made i n  t h e  second s e c t o r  and t h e  number of days s i n c e  t h e  l a s t  f l i g h t  
of P3. I t  might be  specula ted  t h a t  a s h o r t  recency i s  more impor tan t  t o  t h e  
P l ’ s  and P3’s, who w e r e  o l d e r  than  t h e  P2‘s. 
s i n c e  l a s t  f l i g h t  by t h e  P1 w a s  n o t  in f luenced  by whether he  w a s  t h e  f l y i n g  
o r  nonf ly ing  p i l o t .  
The e f f e c t  of t h e  number of days 
~ 
The t i m e  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  d e c i s i o n  ( i . e . ,  t o  s h u t  down t h e  engine i n  Sec- 
t o r  2) w a s  r e g r e s s e d  on t h e  percentage r ise i n  h e a r t  ra te  of P1 20 sec b e f o r e  
t h e  d e c i s i o n  both  when f l y i n g  and no t  f l y i n g .  The d e c i s i o n  took longer  i f  
P 1  w a s  t h e  f l y i n g  p i l o t ,  bu t  h e a r t  r a t e  had no a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
t i m e .  No such r e l a t i o n s h i p  w a s  found f o r  e i t h e r  of t h e  subsequent d e c i s i o n s .  
I t  w a s  a l s o  found t h a t  t h e  t i m e  taken t o  n o t i c e  t h e  o i l  c l o g  p r e d i c t s  
t h e  number of e r r o r s  i n  t h e  h igh  workload s e c t o r s .  T h i s  b e h a v i o r a l  measure 
of v i g i l a n c e  seems t o  be  a b e t t e r  i n d i c a t o r  of performance than  does h e a r t  
ra te .  
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Ergonomics 
Although t h i s  s tudy  w a s  n o t  d i r e c t e d  towards t h e  more mechanis t ic  f a c e t s  
of f l i g h t  deck o p e r a t i o n ,  i t  w a s  i n e v i t a b l e  t h a t  t h e s e  should be  no t i ced  i f  
t h e r e  w e r e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  t h a t  impinged on t h e  performance'of t h e  f l i g h t  crews. 
Severa l  examples of poor d e s i g n  i n  regard  t o  ergonomics were seen  concerning 
equipment, documents, and i l l u m i n a t i o n .  
Flight deck layout and instrumentation- Lack of a t t e n t i o n  t o  human 
f a c t o r s  w a s  ev iden t  i n  t h e  l ayou t  of bo th  t h e  p i l o t ' s  and t h e  e n g i n e e r ' s  
ins t rument  pane l s  i n  t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n  between c o n t r o l s  and i n d i c a t o r s  and i n  
t h e  excess ive  r each  needed t o  o p e r a t e  some c o n t r o l s .  The p o s i t i o n  of t h e  
c e n t r a l  warning and c a u t i o n  panel  and i t s  p o s s i b l e  e f f e c t  on response  times 
has a l r e a d y  been a l luded  t o .  D e f i c i e n c i e s  w e r e  a l s o  seen  i n  t h e  human f a c t o r  
a s p e c t s  of c o n t r o l l e r s  f o r  r a d i o ,  communication and nav iga t ion  equipment. 
Examples of t h e s e  were seen  i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  and format of t h e  r eadou t s  and 
c o n t r o l s  f o r  t h e  frequency s e l e c t i o n  and t h e  p o s i t i o n  and format  of keyboards 
and r eadou t s  f o r  i n e r t i a l  nav iga t ion .  
Important  d e f e c t s  r e l a t e d  t o  c o n t r o l  of engine  power. I n  t h e  forward 
h a l f  of t h e i r  travel, t h e  fou r  power l e v e r s  ( t h r o t t l e s )  are too  f a r  away 
and too  much o f f s e t  from t h e  mid l ine  of p i l o t s  w i th  s h o r t e r  a r m s ,  t hus  making 
p r e c i s e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  c o n t r o l  of power d i f f i c u l t  f o r  some. Furthermore,  t h e  
" f ee l "  of t he  levers i s  such t h a t ,  as they approach t h e i r  forward p o s i t i o n ,  
s m a l l  movements produce comparat ively l a r g e  changes of power. 
The i n d i c a t i o n  most used f o r  s e t t i n g  t h e  amount of power is  t h e  engine 
p r e s s u r e  r a t i o  (EPR). I n  t h e  f l i g h t  deck t h e  gauges measuring t h e  EPR have 
s m a l l ,  complex d i a l s  2 i n .  i n  diameter .  There are two t h r e e - d i g i t  coun te r s ,  
one f o r  s e t t i n g  t h e  "bug" o r  " lubber  mark" on t h e  scale f o r  t h e  c a l c u l a t e d  
maximum f o r  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  f l i g h t  cond i t ions  and another  showing t h e  in s t an -  
taneous EPR va lues .  There i s  a p o i n t e r  and scale showing t h e  s a m e  va lues .  
The f igures  on the counters are s m a l l  and d i f f i c u l t  to  s e e ,  e spec ia l ly  by many 
c a p t a i n s  who are pres-byopic;  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  is  accentua ted  i n  low l e v e l s  
of i l l u m i n a t i o n .  Though t h e  p o i n t e r  is  bold  and i t s  angu la r  p o s i t i o n  can be  
seen  e a s i l y ,  t h e  scale i s  s h o r t ,  due t o  t h e  s m a l l  d iameter  and because t h e  
p o i n t e r  o p e r a t e s  over  no more than  about  t h r e e - f i f t h s  of t h e  circumference.  
The f i g u r e s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  scale marks are even smaller than those  i n  
t h e  d i g i t a l  readouts .  
The exhaust  gas  temperature  (EGT) i n d i c a t o r s  w e r e  a l s o  d i f f i c u l t  t o  read  
because of s h o r t  scales and p o i n t e r s .  Tunnel l ing  by t h e  b e z e l  r i n g s  obs t ruc t ed  
t h e  scales of t he  hydrau l i c  f l u i d  c o n t e n t s  gauges when viewed a t  an  ang le ,  and 
t h i s  may have con t r ibu ted  t o  t h e  f a i l u r e  of many P 3 ' s  t o  m o t i c e  t h e  d e p l e t i o n  
of t h e  con ten t s .  
The a i r speed  i n d i c a t o r  (ASI) f i t t e d  t o  t h i s  model has  a s i n g l e  p o i n t e r  
On t h e  same d i a l  and a s i n g l e  t u r n  scale showing i n d i c a t e d  a i r speed  (IAS). 
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t h e r e  i s  a d i g i t a l  readout  f o r  computed a i r speed  (CAS).' 
is  expanded i n  t h a t  p o r t i o n  used f o r  takeoff  and approach but  compressed 
between 200 and 300 knots .  I n  t h i s  range t h e  scale i s  s h o r t  and f o r  a c c u r a t e  
informat ion  t h e  gaze must b e  switched t o  t h e  readout  of t h e  CAS because t h e  
change i n  t h e  a n g l e  of t h e  p o i n t e r  is  n o t  a s u f f i c i e n t  cue.  The i n s t a n c e s  
of high and low IAS no t i ced  i n  t h i s  range  may be  due i n  p a r t  t o  t h e s e  d i f f i -  
c u l t i e s .  The movable " lubber  marks'' o r  "bugs" f i t t e d  t o  t h e  pe r iphe ry  of t h e  
b e z e l  r i n g s  of t h e  AS1 t h a t  are used f o r  r e f e r e n c e  speeds f o r  takeoff  and 
landing  have excess ive  p a r a l l a x .  
The s c a l e  f o r  IAS 
Other i n d i c a t o r s  might be  found wanting i f  d i f f e r e n t  s c e n a r i o s  r e l a t e d  t o  
them as s p e c i f i c a l l y  as t h e  t a s k s  i n  t h i s  one d id  t o  ASI, EPR, EGT, hydrau l i c  
q u a n t i t y  and o i l  p r e s s u r e  gauges. 
The c e n t r a l  warning panel  w a s  pos i t i oned  t o  t h e  l e f t  of t h e  p i l o t ' s  
engine ins t rument  pane l  near  i t s  lower edge. 
and w a s  o f t e n  obscured from P l ' s  gaze by any unfolded c h a r t s  he w a s  u s ing  f o r  
naviga t ion .  The warning panel  w a s  s i m i l a r l y  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  P3 t o  see because 
i t  would be  obscured by P l ' s  body and t h r o t t l e  arm. 
It w a s  no t  r e a d i l y  seen  by P2 
The combination of awkward c o n t r o l s  and poor in s t rumen ta t ion  almost  
c e r t a i n l y  con t r ibu ted  t o  t h e  rough handl ing of power t h a t  w a s  s een  on s e v e r a l  
occas ions .  During a c t u a l  f l i g h t  ope ra t ions ,  handl ing  of power can a f f e c t  
passenger  comfort  and peace of mind and i n  some c i rcumstances  may c o n t r i b u t e  
t o  a r educ t ion  of engine  l i f e  consequent upon overboos t ing .  I n  some approach 
c o n d i t i o n s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  when t h e r e  is a seve re  windshear ,  d e f e c t i v e  power han- 
d l i n g  may a f f e c t  f l i g h t  s a f e t y .  
IIZmination- Ligh t ing  i n  t h i s  f l i g h t  deck w a s  inadequate  f o r  s e v e r a l  
t a sks .  
who o f t e n  had t o  use  t h e i r  f l a s h l i g h t s .  The i l l u m i n a t i o n  provided f o r  t h e  
reading  of c h a r t s  and o t h e r  documents w a s  poor and t h e  overhead l i g h t s  seemed 
inadequate ;  on s e v e r a l  occas ions  the  P l ' s  were seen t o  u s e  t h e  thunderstorm 
l i g h t i n g  f o r  t h e  forward ins t rument  pane l  t o  read  c h a r t s .  To do s o ,  they  had 
t o  l e a n  forward, ho ld ing  t h e  c h a r t  i n  f r o n t  of t h e  c o n t r o l  column t o  c a t c h  
t h e  l i g h t  coming from under t h e  g l a r e s h i e l d ,  t hus  o b s t r u c t i n g  t h e i r  view of 
much of t h e  pane l .  
V i s i b i l i t y  of t h e  overhead panels  w a s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  poor f o r  t h e  P3 ' s  
Doementation- A very l a r g e  number of documents is  requ i r ed  f o r  t h e  
conduct of a c i v i l  t r a n s p o r t  f l i g h t .  These documents r e f e r  t o  s e v e r a l  classes 
of in format ion  and may be sepa ra t ed  accord ing  t o  t h e i r  permanence. There are 
fou r  l o o s e  l e a f  volumes of o p e r a t i n g  manuals, two r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  a i r c r a f t  and 
two t o  the  gene ra l  ope ra t ing  p o l i c y  of t he  a i r l i n e ;  changes i n  t h e s e  documents 
are r e l a t i v e l y  i n f r e q u e n t .  Next i n  permanence are t h e  c h a r t s  and approach 
p l a t e s  conta ined  i n  t h e  r o u t e  and a i r p o r t  manual. These are stowed i n  l o o s e  
l e a f  b inde r s  from which t h e  r e l e v a n t  s h e e t s  are removed f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  s t a g e  
' CAS is  IAS less t h e  s t a t i c  source  p o s i t i o n  e r r o r  and w i l l  r ead  
0-5 knots  h igher  than  t h e  a i r speed  p o i n t e r .  
a t  low a l t i t u d e s  and a t  speeds less than 200 knots .  
The d i f f e r e n c e  w i l l  be  s m a l l  
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of t h e  f l i g h t  and are updated a t  monthly i n t e r v a l s .  
ments, which relates o n l y  t o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  f l i g h t  i n  hand, c o n s i s t s  of t h e  
p r i n t o u t s  of  f l i g h t  p l a n s ,  copies  of  weight and ba lance  s h e e t s ,  and weather 
maps. 
The t h i r d  class of docu- 
The main d i f f i c u l t y  wi th  t h e  a i r c r a f t  and o p e r a t i o n s  manuals l i e s  i n  
a t tempt ing  r a p i d  l o c a t i o n  of in format ion  t h a t  does n o t  seem l o g i c a l  i n  i t s  
l a y o u t .  
and f l a p  s e t t i n g s  are l i s t e d  under t h e  main heading of "Minimum Equipment," 
a l though t h i s  t i t l e  is  merely t h e  f i r s t  i t e m  i n  a l i s t  t h a t  i s  covered by t h e  
t i t l e  "Limi ta t ions ."  The format of t h e  t a b l e  f o r  s t a l l  speed i s  i t s e l f  con- 
f u s i n g ;  t h e  v a l u e s  are modified by f a c t o r s  contained i n  a €ootnote  t h a t  i s  n o t  
i n  a l o g i c a l  o r d e r .  
For example, t h e  t a b l e s  about s t a l l  speeds f o r  d i f f e r e n t  g r o s s  weights  
Not o n l y  were t h e r e  problems i n  t h e  nomenclature of t h e  i n d i c e s ,  b u t  
o f t e n ,  when several i t e m s  were needed a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  t h e y  could n o t  e a s i l y  
be c ross - re ferenced .  On s e v e r a l  occas ions  P 3 ' s  were seen t o  be keeping t h e i r  
f i n g e r s  between as many as t h r e e  s e p a r a t e  pages so as t o  avoid repea ted  r e f e r -  
ence t o  t h e  index.  
volumes s o  t h a t  t h e y  are e a s i l y  a c c e s s i b l e .  
There i s  a l s o  a problem i n  stowing t h e s e  r a t h e r  bulky 
I n  o r d e r  t o  combat some o f  t h e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  several crew members had 
quick r e f e r e n c e  c a r d s  t h e y  had made up themselves.  Although t h i s  may overcome 
some of t h e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  of t h e  manuals, i t  i n t r o d u c e s  a n o t h e r  hazard i n  t h e  
use  of nonstandard informat ion  t h a t  may be  i n a c c u r a t e  and o u t  of d a t e .  
The r o u t e  and a i r p o r t  manual is  t o o  bulky t o  use  wi thout  removing t h e  
s h e e t s  needed f o r  t h e  t r i p  from t h e  cover ,  and stowing t h e s e  s h e e t s  then pre- 
s e n t s  a problem. Many ways of organiz ing  t h e s e  f l imsy  s h e e t s  w e r e  s een ,  per- 
haps t h e  b e s t  c o n s i s t e d  of p l a s t i c  envelopes bound t o g e t h e r .  I n  t h i s  way, t h e  
r e q u i r e d  s h e e t s  were easy t o  hold and see. The worst  s i t u a t i o n  n o t i c e d  w a s  
t h a t  genera ted  by a PI dur ing  t h e  r e t u r n  t o  New York: he  had 10 of t h e s e  
f l imsy  s h e e t s  i n  h i s  hands whi le  he t r i e d  t o  a s s o c i a t e  t h e  runway dimensions 
and c o n d i t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  optimum landing  gross  weight and weather l i m i t s  f o r  
d i f f e r e n t  d i v e r s i o n  a i r f i e l d s .  
The weight and ba lance  s h e e t  i s  w e l l  planned and e a s i l y  understood.  The 
c o p i e s  of t h e  f l i g h t  p l a n  and t h e  weather  maps, however, seem t o  be  on poor 
q u a l i t y  paper  and t h e i r  low c o l o r  c o n t r a s t  makes them d i f f i c u l t  t o  use.  
Without t h e  a i r c r a f t  and o p e r a t i o n s  manuals, t h e  amount of paperwork 
needed for  t h i s  two-sector s c e n a r i o  (Dulles ,  JFK and London (LHR) h a s  a s i n g l e  
s i d e  area of some 20 m2 ( f i g .  3 ) ) .  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The observers ,  t h e  t r a i n i n g  c a p t a i n  c o o r d i n a t o r ,  and t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  
aircrew were a l l  convinced of t h e  realism of  t h e  s imula t ion  of t h e  s c e n a r i o .  
S i m i l a r  e f f e c t s  t o  those  o f  a c t u a l  f l i g h t  o p e r a t i o n s  were produced by h i g h  
workload, u n f a m i l i a r  n a v i g a t i o n  and u n f a m i l i a r  a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  r o u t i n g .  
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Arousal ,  a s  measured by h e a r t  ra te ,  mir rored  o b s e r v a t i o n s  made i n  f l i g h t  and 
t h e  rates and t y p e s  of e r r o r s  w e r e  a l s o  s i m i l a r .  r 
The r e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  h igh  workload can l e a d  t o  decreased performance 
of f l i g h t  crews. 
systems and mis takes  i n  n a v i g a t i o n  t h a t  are  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  prolonged response 
t i m e s  t o  a i r c r a f t  a b n o r m a l i t i e s .  
This  decrease  i s  manifested by e r r o r s  i n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  of 
Some of t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  are  induced by d e f i c i e n c i e s  i.n t h e  des ign  of 
f l i g h t  decks and ins t rumenta t ion ,  o t h e r s  by those  of documents and c h a r t s .  
Many o f  t h e  problems, however, re la te  t o  t h e  management of human and mechani- 
ca l  r e s o u r c e s .  The v a r i a b i l i t y  between crews i n  r e a c t i n g  t.o t h e  same problems 
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h o s e  who perform less w e l l  might be helped by s p e c i a l  t r a i n i n g .  
Consequently,  i t  i s  recommended t h a t  a i r c r a f t  and equi-pment manufacturers  
be reminded of t h e  importance of des igning  f l i g h t  decks and i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n  t o  
t h e  b e s t  human f a c t o r s  p r a c t i c e ,  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  e f f o r t  should be given t o  
redes igning  documents and c h a r t s ,  and t h a t  s p e c i a l  t r a i n i n g  i n  resource  man- 
agement and capta incy  be developed and v a l i d a t e d .  Such t r a i n i n g  should 
i n c l u d e  t h e  use  of f u l l  mission s i m u l a t i o n  of s c e n a r i o s  t h a t  are representa-  
t i ve  of  a c t u a l  s i t u a t i o n s .  S p e c i a l  emphasis should be given t o  t h o s e  s i t u a -  
t i o n s  where r a p i d  d e c i s i o n s  and s a f e  s o l u t i o n s  f o r  o p e r a t i n g  problems a r e  
requi red .  
The techniques  developed t o  produce r e a l i s t i c  s i t u a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  f u l l  
mission s i m u l a t i o n  achieved i n  t h i s  s tudy  might a l s o  be  used i n  t h e  i n v e s t i g a -  
t i o n  of a i r c r a f t  a c c i d e n t s .  Reenactment of t h e  f l i g h t ,  wi th  a l l  known f a c t o r s  
inc luded  and w i t h  as much f i d e l i t y  as p o s s i b l e ,  might h e l p  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  
cha in  of e v e n t s  preceding  t h e  f i n a l  c r i t i c a l  e r r o r .  (The reenactment should 
be done by l inecrews  wi th  e q u i v a l e n t  exper ience . )  Such an e x e r c i s e  revea led  
s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r s  t h a t  helped t o  e l u c i d a t e  t h e  a c c i d e n t  i-nvolving B r i t i s h  
European Airways Tr ident  1 a f t e r  takeoff  from London i n  1972 ( r e f .  5 ) .  
The s a m e  t echniques  might be b e n e f i c i a l  i n  developing and v a l i d a t i n g  
s t a n d a r d  o p e r a t i n g  procedures  t o  achieve  optimum i n t e g r a t i o n  of f l i g h t c r e w s  
and t o  avoid c o n f l i c t i n g  i n s t r u c t i o n s  and a c t i v i t i e s .  
A m e s  Research Center  
Nat iona l  Aeronaut ics  and Space Admin.istration 
Moffe t t  F i e l d ,  C a l i f . ,  94035, August 2 4 ,  1978 
35 
APPENDIX A 
NARRATIVES OF SOME TYPICAL ERRORS 
T h i s  appendix c o n s i s t s  of d e s c r i p t i o n s  of c e r t a i n  s p e c i f i c  e r r o r s  t h a t  
were chosen f o r  f u r t h e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  because of t h e i r  importance. 
t o  l a n d i n g  g r o s s  weight ,  n a v i g a t i o n  and engine handl ing .  
They r e l a t e  
Example of E r r o r  i n  Landing Gross Weight 
The fol lowing is a d e s c r i p t i o n  of t h e  circumstances t h a t  l e d  t o  P3 dump- 
i n g  77,000 l b  t o o  l i t t l e  f u e l  and how t h i s  mis take  w a s  allowed t o  p e r s i s t .  
The landing  w a s  made a t  a g r o s s  weight i n  excess  of t h a t  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  
a v a i l a b l e  s topping  d i s t a n c e .  
A f t e r  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  dump f u e l  had been made and without  c o n s u l t a t i o n  of 
documents r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  l e n g t h  and c o n d i t i o n s  of t h e  runway i n  use ,  t h e  
f i g u r e  of 84,000 l b ,  the accepted m a x i m u m  w e i g h t  f o r  any runway, w a s  a r r i v e d  
a t  by P1 and P2 without  d i s c u s s i o n .  
P3 t h e n  c a l c u l a t e d  a dump t i m e  of 4 min 30 sec; t h i s  w a s  accepted by P1 
wi thout  comment, a l though i t  i s  approximately one-third of t h e  t i m e  needed. 
Without prompting, P3 then  r e c a l c u l a t e d  t h e  dump r e q u i r e d  and a r r i v e d  a t  a 
t i m e  of  12  min f o r  t h e  dump. 
I n s t e a d  of dumping enough f u e l  f o r  t h i s  landing  weight t o  be  achieved,  
having made proper  a l lowance f o r  t h e  e n r o u t e  burn,  P3 then  o n l y  r a n  t h e  dump 
f o r  3 min, perhaps because h e  r e v e r t e d  t o  h i s  o r i g i n a l  e r roneous  f i g u r e  o r  
because h e  misread t h e  g r o s s  weight i n d i c a t o r .  U n s a t i s f i e d ,  he  a g a i n  s t a r t e d  
t o  r e c a l c u l a t e  b u t  w a s  i n t e r r u p t e d  by t h e  d e p l e t i o n  of No. 3 h y d r a u l i c  system. 
During t h e  next  8 min P3 w a s  subjec ted  t o  a h igh  workload but  t h e n  
n o t i c e d  t h a t  t h e  g r o s s  weight w a s  much t o o  h igh  and decided t o  r e f i g u r e  t h e  
f u e l .  During t h a t  t i m e  he w a s  s u b j e c t e d  t o  f u r t h e r  i n t e r r u p t i o n s  and d i d  
noth ing  more about t h e  f u e l  u n t i l  P 1  n o t i c e d  t h a t  t h e  g r o s s  weight i n d i c a t o r  
read  647,000 l b  and decided t o  make a n  over  g r o s s  weight landing .  A minute 
and a h a l f  l a t e r ,  P3 rechecked t h e  f u e l  as p a r t  of t h e  landing  check l i s t  and 
became concerned about t h e  g r o s s  weight .  H e  spent  a minute and a h a l f  
rechecking c a l c u l a t i o n s  and announced t h a t  t h e  a i r c r a f t  g r o s s  weight computer 
must be  i n  e r r o r .  Two min la ter  t h e  s i m u l a t o r  w a s  "landed" a t  172 k n o t s  w i t h  
only 25" f l a p  wi th  1 ,000  f t / m i n  descent  a t  about 77,000 l b  over  t h e  c o r r e c t  
weight.  
During t h e  32 min between t h e  t i m e  t h e  d e c i s i o n  w a s  made t o  dump f u e l  and 
t h e  landing ,  t h e r e  were 15 i n t e r r u p t i o n s  t o  P3 ' s  s p e c i f i c  t a s k s  concerning 
t a i l o r i n g  t h e  amount of f u e l  t o  be  dumped i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  and 
l e n g t h  of t h e  landing  runway. These i n t e r r u p t i o n s  c o n s i s t e d  of :  
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P1 r e q u e s t s  
Three engine  d r i f t  down speed? 
How long t o  dump? 
How is  dump going? (during check l i s t  be fo re  start  of dump) 
Head wind component f o r  landing?  
Three engine  c r u i s e  speed? 
Check l ists  i n s t i g a t e d  by P1 
Completing engine shutdown check 
One engine i n o p e r a t i v e  check l ist  ( s t a r t e d  twice  because of 
i n t e r r u p t  i o n s )  
Other 
P r e s s u r i z a t i o n  c o n t r o l  - cab in  p re s su re  alt imeter 
Steward 's  l i s t  of passengers  needing r e t i c k e t i n g  f o r  t r ansmiss ion  t o  
Fydrau l i c  q u a n t i t y  d e p l e t i o n  warning l i g h t  
Ground Operat ions ( t h r e e  r e q u e s t s  and one compliance) 
I n  t h i s  way P3 w a s  never a b l e  t o  complete and v e r i f y  h i s  f u e l  ca l cu la -  
t i o n s  and dump t i m e s  be fo re  he w a s  i n t e r r u p t e d ,  e i t h e r  as a r o u t i n e  p a r t  of 
s t anda rd  o p e r a t i n g  procedures  (SOP'S) o r  by a r eques t  from P1 o r  t h e  s e n i o r  
steward. P3 t h u s  became overloaded and h i s  work fragmented. P1 f a i l e d  t o  
recognize  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  and so d id  noth ing  t o  r e s o l v e  i t  ( s e e  page 15) .  
In t h e  f a c e  of l a t e r  evidence,  t h e  e r r o r  seemed due t o  a p e r s i s t e n c e  of  
an o r i g i n a l  misconcept ion.  
g ross  weight computer w a s  considered a t  f a u l t  r a t h e r  t han  P3 ' s  c a l c u l a t i o n s .  
During t h i s  t i m e  t h e  h e a r t  ra te  of P3 w a s  i nc reased  by 25%; t h i s  i n d i c a t e d  
cons ide rab le  a r o u s a l  t h a t  may not  have been opt imal  f o r  t h e  t a s k  i n  hand. 
R a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  took p l a c e  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  
Examples of Naviga t iona l  E r ro r  
Examination of t h e  d a t a  r e v e a l s  how, i n  t h r e e  runs ,  P1 f a i l e d  t o  start  
the right-hand holding pattern at Bohemia on the way back to New York. This 
should have been done a t  a po in t  10 m i  s h o r t  of Deer Park VOR ( see  page 1 4 ) .  
Depart ing Riverhead VOR, w i th  P 1  f l y i n g  t h e  a i r c r a f t  on ve ry  
n e a r l y  t h e  c o r r e c t  heading and having appa ren t ly  misread t h e  c h a r t ,  
they  were in t end ing  t o  e n t e r  t h e  hold a t  10 m i  by d i s t a n c e  measur- 
i ng  equipment (DME) p a s t  Riverhead r a t h e r  t han  t h e  same d i s t a n c e  
be fo re  Deer Park,  t h e  next  way p o i n t .  
Depar t ing  Riverhead 77 min a f t e r  t a k e o f f ,  P2 communicated wi th  
A i r  T r a f f i c  Control  (ATC) and obta ined  c l e a r a n c e  t o  descend t o  
15,000 f t .  P 1  n o t i f i e d  ATC 15 s e c  l a t e r  t h a t  he w a s  on t h e  r a d i a l  
from Riverhead f o r  t he  hold ing  p a t t e r n ,  reduced power, and s t a r t e d  
t o  l o s e  h e i g h t .  
read ing  t h e  "Hydraulic Abnormal" check l i s t  f o r  t h e  approach. 
During t h i s  t i m e  P2 w a s  s tudying  c h a r t s  and P3 w a s  
A t  79 min, t h e  d i s t a n c e  from Riverhead had become 1 7  m i  by 
DME, and P 1  s t a r t e d  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  hydrau l i c  problem wi th  P2; he  
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had a p p a r e n t l y  f o r g o t t e n  t h e  ATC i n s t r u c t i o n  t o  hold o r  w a s  
experiencing a time-compression e f f e c t  due t o  d i v e r s i o n  of h i s  
a t t e n t i o n .  
A t  79 min 30 sec, P1 remarked t h a t  t h e y  w e r e  now 22 i n s t e a d  
of 1 0  m i  p a s t  Riverhead, but  took no a c t i o n .  H e  cont inued d i s -  
cuss ing  w i t h  P2 t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h e  wetness of t h e  landing  runway. 
H e  decided t h e r e  w a s  need t o  dump more f u e l  t o  achieve  a landing  
g r o s s  weight of 564,000 l b ,  and P3 s t a r t e d  t o  make t h e  r e q u i r e d  
f u e l  c a l c u l a t i o n s .  
A t  81 rnin 30 sec,  and 33 m i  by DME from Riverhead, t h e  s i t u a -  
t i o n  w a s  reso lved  by t h e  s imulated ATC querying t h e  p o s i t i o n  of 
t h e  a i r c r a f t  and g i v i n g  r a d a r  v e c t o r s .  
S i m i l a r  e r r o r s  i n  over-running t h e  hold were made i n  two o t h e r  runs .  I n  
one, immediately preceding t h e  e r r o r ,  P1 and P2 were d i s c u s s i n g  i n  t h e  same 
way t h e  l e n g t h  of t h e  landing  runway and t h e  f u e l  dump r e q u i r e d .  
On d e p a r t i n g  Riverhead, P1 asked P3 t o  read t h e  "One Engine 
Out" approach check l i s t .  ATC t h e n  c a l l e d  t o  change frequency t o  
Kennedy approach. This  i n s t r u c t i o n  w a s  no t  understood t h e  f i r s t  
t i m e  and ATC repea ted  i t .  
reques ted  a change of t ransponder  code and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .  A t  68.05 
P I  took  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  a i r c r a f t  hack from P2, and they  set t h e  
approach and landing  speeds and c r i t i c a l  h e i g h t s  by moving t h e  ''bugs'' 
o r  " lubber  marks" on t h e  a i r s p e e d  i n d i c a t o r s ,  p r e s s u r e ,  and r a d i o  
alt imeters.  
P1 complied and Kennedy approach c o n t r o l  
They depar ted  Riverhead, having decided t h a t  t h e  hold a t  
Bohemia w a s  1 0  m i  d i s t a n t .  
P3 i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  they  had t o o  h igh  a g r o s s  weight f o r  t h e  landing  
runway, and P1 and P2 d iscussed  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  f l a p  s e t t i n g .  During 
t h i s  t i m e  they  f l e w  f o r  4 min b e f o r e  P2 n o t i c e d  t h a t  they  w e r e  
through t h e  hold and set  t h e  reverse heading of 084 .  Thus, t h e y  
went 24 i n s t e a d  of 10  m i  b e f o r e  commencing t h e  hold.  
I n  a n o t h e r  run,  fol lowing an animated d i s c u s s i o n  between P1 and P2 con- 
cern ing  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  had t o  be  m e t  t o  use  t h e  s h o r t ,  w e t ,  out-of-wind 
runway, P1 w a s  t h e  " f ly ing"  p i l o t  and cont inued t o  f l y  t h e  a i r c r a f t  wi thout  
g i v i n g  i t  t o  P2 f o r  a minute.  
P1 and P2 decided t o  start  t h e  hold 1 0  m i  by DME p a s t  Riverhead. 
However, P1 cont inued f o r  7 min a t  about  5 m i  per  min b e f o r e  t u r n i n g  
t o  reverse t h e  hold.  
During t h i s  t i m e ,  P1 w a s  having d i f f i c u l t y  i n  hand-flying t h e  
a i r c r a f t  a c c u r a t e l y .  While P1 and P2 d iscussed  t h e  approach speed 
and f l a p  s e t t i n g s  f o r  t h e  intended landing  runway, b o t h  h e i g h t  and 
speed w e r e  a f f e c t e d .  I n d i c a t e d  a i r s p e e d  w a s  20 k n o t s  less than  t h e  
recommended minimum without  f l a p s  a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  g r o s s  weight ,  a lmost  
38 
a t  t h e  s t ick-shake  condi t ion .  T h r o t t l e  handl ing by P1 w a s  rough, 
wi th  l a r g e  power changes - s t r a i g h t  from i d l e  t o  1 .25 EPR. Later 
EPR's were up t o  1.44 o r  above f o r  50 sec. Vert ical  speed v a r i e d  
from -759 t o  +829 f t l s e c .  
I 
This  w a s  a t y p i c a l  demonstrat ion of t h e  e f f e c t  of a complex mental  t a s k  
on manual s k i l l .  P 1  could have resolved h i s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  by r e q u i r i n g  P2 t o  
f l y  t h e  a i r c r a f t  dur ing  t h e  hold ,  t h u s  a l lowing  P1  t o  marshal  h i s  thoughts .  
Examples of E r r o r s  i n  Engine Handling 
The important  e r r o r s  i n  engine handl ing  were of two k inds :  overboost ing 
of t h e  remaining engine a f t e r  No. 2 had been s h u t  down and t h e  m i s i n t e r p r e t a -  
t i o n  of f l u c t u a t i o n s  of t h e  EPR caused by i c i n g  of t h e  p r e s s u r e  probes i n  t h e  
engine n a c e l l e s  ( s e e  page 1 4 ) .  
Examples of errors invoZving overboosting- There were f i v e  examples of 
t h i s  t y p e  of e r r o r :  
1. A f t e r  s h u t t i n g  down t h e  engine,  P1, who w a s  t h e  f l y i n g  
p i l o t ,  overboosted t h e  remaining engines  t o  1 .89 EPR, presumably i n  
an a t tempt  t o  main ta in  h e i g h t  and speed. P2 w a s  engaged i n  commun- 
i c a t i o n  w i t h  ATC and P3 w a s  running t h e  "dump" check l i s t .  Thus 
e f f e c t i v e  monitor ing w a s  absent .  It seems t h a t  t h i s  e r r o r  might 
have been prevented had P1 handed over  t h e  f l y i n g  of t h e  a i r c r a f t  t o  
P2 w i t h  t h e  s t a r t  of t h e  engine problem so  t h a t  he could have g iven  
h i s  a t t e n t i o n  t o  decisionmaking r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  cont inuing  t o  f l y .  
2 .  A s imi l a r  i n c i d e n t  occurred when P1 w a s  t h e  f l y i n g  p i l o t .  
The remaining engines  were overboosted t o  1 .68  EPR about 10  min 
a f t e r  No .  2 had been s h u t  down. During t h i s  t i m e  P 1  had been d i s -  
cuss ing  w i t h  P2 t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of t h e  d i v e r s i o n  t o  t h e  s h o r t  
runway a t  JFK, a rguing  about t h e  power r e q u i r e d  t o  " d r i f t  down,'' 
o b t a i n i n g  f u r t h e r  weather r e p o r t s ,  and d i s c u s s i n g  landing  g r o s s  
weight and f l a p  s e t t i n g s .  
P3 had a l s o  been busy dur ing  t h i s  per iod  c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  
amount of f u e l  t o  dump and running t h e  dump check l ist .  A l l  t h r e e  
crew members had t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  d i v e r t e d ,  and t h e  monitor ing of  
t h e  a i r c r a f t  parameters  lapsed .  It seems l i k e l y  t h a t  t h i s  e r r o r  
would have been prevented had P1 given t h e  f l y i n g  of t h e  a i r c r a f t  
t o  P2 as soon as t h e  engine  problem became e v i d e n t .  
3. A comparable i n c i d e n t  occurred i n  y e t  a n o t h e r  run when P1 
w a s  t h e  f l y i n g  p i l o t .  Some 4.min a f t e r  N o .  2 engine had been s h u t  
down, P1 wrongly decided i t  w a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  main ta in  31,000 f t  a t  
t h e  c u r r e n t  g r o s s  weight and proceeded t o  overboost  t h e  remaining 
engines .  
P3, however, n o t i c e d  t h e  h igh  EPR v a l u e s  and remonstrated w i t h  P1. 
A t  t h i s  t i m e  P2 w a s  d i s t r a c t e d  by communications w i t h  ATC. 
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4 .  On t h i s  occas ion ,  P2 w a s  t h e  f l y i n g  p i l o t  and immediately 
t h e  No. 2 engine w a s  s h u t  down, P 1  took t h e  a i r c r a f t  from P2 and 
without  c o n s u l t i n g  documents, and a f t e r  o b t a i n i n g  c l e a r a n c e  from ATC, 
decided t o  r e t u r n  t o  JFK. Next, he turned on t h e  a u t o p i l o t  and 
advanced t h e  t h r o t t l e s  t o  1.83 EPR, which a c t i v a t e d  t h e  r ed  l i g h t s  
on t h e  exhaust  g a s  temperature  (EGT) gauges.  A f t e r  some 1 0  sec, P2 
n o t i c e d  t h e  EGT ' s  and t h r o t t l e d  back. P1 and P3 d i d  noth ing  d u r i n g  
t h i s  t i m e .  
5. I n  t h i s  example P1 w a s  t h e  f l y i n g  p i l o t  and maintained con- 
t r o l  of t h e  a i r c r a f t  dur ing  a l l  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  of weather,  a l t e r n a t e  
a i r f i e l d s ,  and landing  g r o s s  weight.  Then, dur ing  d e s c e n t ,  about  
1 5  min a f t e r  t h e  engine problem w a s  n o t i c e d ,  t h e  a u t o p i l o t  warning 
horn came on as t h e  h y d r a u l i c  system was d e p l e t e d .  
"s tar t le"  r e a c t i o n  by P1, who advanced t h e  t h r o t t l e s  enough t o  over- 
boos t  t h e  remaining engines  t o  1.88 EPR and a c t i v a t e  t h e  EGT warning 
l i g h t s .  
This  produced a 
It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  t h i n k  of a l o g i c a l  reason  f o r  t h i s  a c t i o n .  However, 
a s  he w a s  descending, P1 may have had a "set" t o  regard  any warning as r e l a t e d  
t o  ground proximity u n l e s s  i t  w a s  proved otherwise.  
Examples of errors involving inopportune reduction of power- There w e r e  
two examples of t h i s  type  o r  e r r o r :  
1. I c i n g  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  engine n a c e l l e s  i s  n o t  a c t i v a t e d  p r i o r  
t o  t a k e o f f  a l though r e p o r t e d  c o n d i t i o n s  warranted t h i s .  P2 w a s  t h e  
f l y i n g  p i l o t .  Three minutes  a f t e r  t h e  power was a p p l i e d  f o r  t a k e o f f ,  
engine i c i n g  w a s  s imulated.  The EPR gauges then  f l u c t u a t e d  w h i l e  
a l l  o t h e r  engine ins t ruments  showed normal r e a d i n g s .  P3 p u l l e d  back 
t h e  t h r o t t l e  levers  d u r i n g  a climbing t u r n ;  t h e  speed dropped t o  
140 knots  and t h e  s t i c k  shaker  began t o  o p e r a t e .  P3 pushed t h e  
t h r o t t l e s  forward then  brought them back. P1 then  r e a p p l i e d  t a k e o f f  
power. 
The o r i g i n a l  e r r o r  of f a i l i n g  t o  a c t i v a t e  engine n a c e l l e  i ce  p r o t e c t i o n  
may be  because i t  only  occurs  once i n  t h e  p r e - t a x i  check l i s t  and i n  no o t h e r  
p r i o r  t o  t a k e  o f f .  The e r r o r  made by P3 i n  p u l l i n g  back t h e  t h r o t t l e s  when 
t h e  EPR gauges f l u c t u a t e d  may be  due t o  h i s  f a i l u r e  t o  scan more than  one 
i n d i c a t o r  of power dur ing  t h e  t a k e o f f  and i n i t i a l  cl imb r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  l a c k  of 
v i g i l a n c e .  
T h i s  i n c i d e n t  could i n d i c a t e  t h a t  most P3 ' s  are overconscious of problems 
of engine l i f e  r a t h e r  than  being f u l l y  i n t e g r a t e d  w i t h  t h e  t o t a l  a i r c r a f t  
s i t u a t i o n .  
2. With P1 as t h e  f l y i n g  p i l o t ,  i c i n g  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  engine 
n a c e l l e  w a s  n o t  a c t u a t e d  p r i o r  t o  takeoff  as i n  example No. 1. Three 
minutes  a f t e r  t a k e o f f  power w a s  a p p l i e d ,  engine i c i n g  w a s  s imula ted ,  
l e a d i n g  t o  f l u c t u a t i n g  EPR gauges. 
P2 almost  s imultaneously a c t i v a t e d  engine n a c e l l e  i c e  p r o t e c t i o n ,  
t h e n  P3 r e a p p l i e d  power. 
P3 p u l l e d  back t h e  t h r o t t l e  levers,  
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I n  t h e  second example t h e  l a p s e  w a s  n o t  as s e r i o u s  as  i.n t h e  f i r s t  because 
t h e  engine  i c i n g  w a s  recognized more qu ick ly  and power immediately r e s t o r e d .  
The i n i t i a l  e r r o r ,  however, w a s  probably due t o  f a i l u r e  t o  comply w i t h  t h e  
p re - t ax i  check l ist .  Although i t  d i d  n o t  r e s u l t  i n  a c t i o n  t o  reduce  power, 
t h e r e  w a s  ano the r  i n c i d e n t  when engine  n a c e l l e  i c e  p r o t e c t i o n  w a s  omi t ted  
du r ing  t h e  p r e - t a x i  check, l ead ing  t o  s imi l a r  mal func t ion  of t h e  EPR gauges 
2 min a f t e r  t a k e o f f ,  b u t  t h e  problem w a s  qu ick ly  diagnosed and i c e  p r o t e c t i o n  
tu rned  on. I n  t h i s  even t ,  only a s m a l l  change i n  a i r s p e e d  r e s u l t e d .  
That t h e  same i n i t i a l  e r r o r  w a s  made by 3 crews o u t  of 18 may be due t o  






During t h e  course  of a n  experiment undertaken t o  assess t h e  e f f e c t s  of 
workload on t h e  performance of c i v i l  t r a n s p o r t  aircrews, t h e  oppor tuni ty  w a s  
t aken  t o  measure a v a r i e t y  of parameters .  These included e r r o r s ,  v i g i l a n c e  
and d e c i s i o n  t i m e s .  The h e a r t  rates of t h e  t h r e e , c r e w  members w e r e  a l s o  
recorded cont inuous ly .  
An a t tempt  w a s  made t o  see i f  any of t h e  recorded parameters  w e r e  i n  any 
way r e l a t e d  t o  each o t h e r  o r  t o  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  known about t h e  crew, such as 
t h e i r  age,  exper ience ,  and ca tegory ,  and whether they w e r e  t h e  f l y i n g  p i l o t  
f o r  any p a r t i c u l a r  s e c t o r .  
The c a l c u l a t i o n s  made i n  t h e s e  r e s p e c t s  are as  fol lows.  
C a l c u l a t i o n s  
1. R e l a t i o n s h i p  of h e a r t  ra te  (HR),  expressed as percentage  r ise  over  
lowest recorded " p r e f l i g h t "  t o  f a c t o r s  r e l a t i n g  t o  c r e w  members and phases of 
f l i g h t .  
Percentage r ise  i n  h e a r t  ra te  regressed  on age of P1 and P2 f l y i n g  and 
n o t  f l y i n g .  
F i r s t  S e c t o r s  
Standard 
c o e f f i c i e n t  
Mean standard r e g r e s s i o n  T P (2 t a i l )  d e v i a t i o n  
During takeoff  
Mean age of P1 + P2 49.6 7 . 0  0 .122  -0.744 0.462 
Fly ing  o r  no t  
R i s e  i n  HR, % 
During approach 
Mean age of P1 + P2 49.6 7 . 0  
R i s e  i n  HR, % 31.6 19.4 
F ly ing  o r  n o t  --- --- 





4 2  
On landing  
Mean age of  P1 + P2 
Fly ing  
R i s e  i n  HR, % 
Second S e c t o r s  
During t a k e o f f  
Mean age of  P1 + P2 
Fly ing  
R i s e  i n  HR, % 
During approach 
Mean age of P1 + P2 
Fly ing  
R i s e  i n  HR, % 
On l a n d i n g  
Mean age of  P1 + P2 
Fly ing  
R i s e  i n  HR, % 
Standard 
c o e f f i c i e n t  
Standard r e g r e s s i o n  T P (2 t a i l )  Mean d e v i a t i o n  
49.5 7 .1  0.071 -1.277 0.211 
--- --- .660 3.8 ,001 
45.0 30.2 
49.3 7.0 .059 .366 .717 
,005 --- --- .489 3.036 
33.4 17.6 
-
49.8 6.9 .044 .333 .741 
--- --- .690 5.191 .ooo 
35.0 22.3 
49.7 6.9 -. 089 -. 748 .461 
.ooo -.814 6.980 
2. R e l a t i o n s h i p  of lowest  recorded h e a r t - r a t e  p r e f l i g h t  t o  age  ( P l ,  P2, 
and P3). 
Lowest p r e f l i g h t  r a w  h e a r t  r a t e  regressed  on age.  
Standard 
c o e f f i c i e n t  
P (2 t a i l )  Mean Standard r e g r e s s  i o n  T d e v i a  t i o n  
F i r  st S e c t o r s  
Mean age of  P l + P 2 + P 3  49.6 7.00 
HR 76.7 11.7 
0.052 0.959 
3. R e l a t i o n s h i p  of h e a r t  r a t e  expressed  as percentage  r ise over  lowest  
recorded p r e f l i g h t  t o  age of P1 and P2 w h i l e  f l y i n g .  
Percentage rise of h e a r t  r a t e  whi le  f l y i n g  r e g r e s s e d  on age (P1 and P2).  
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Standard 
c o e f f i c i e n t  
Standard r e g r e s s  i o n  T P (2 t a i l )  
Mean d e v i a t i o n  
F i r  s t S e c t o r s  
During approach 
Mean age of P1 + P2 48.1 7 .3  0.133 0.537 0.599 
Rise i n  HR, % 43.9 19 .8  
On l a n d i n g  
Mean age of P 1  + P2 47.7 7 .3  .071 .277 .79 
R i s e  i n  HR, % 66.8 29.4 
Percentage r ise  of  h e a r t  ra te  while  f l y i n g  regressed  on age (P1 and P2). 
Second S e c t o r s  
During approach 
Mean age of P I  + P2 51.6 6.7 0.133 0.26 0.789 
R i s e  i n  HR, % 50.9 20.1 
On landing  
Mean age of P1 + P2 51.6 6.7 -.290 -1.174 .259 
R i s e  i n  HR, % 76.3 23.4 
Note: Because of t h e  l a c k  of  e f f e c t  of age on t h e  r ise i n  h e a r t  r a t e ,  
e i t h e r  f o r  t h e  p r e f l i g h t ,  approach, o r  landing  c o n d i t i o n ,  t h i s  v a r i a b l e  
(age) has  n o t  been used i n  subsequent c a l c u l a t i o n s .  
4. R e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  t i m e  t aken  t o  n o t i c e  t h e  clogged o i l  f i l t e r  
i n  t h e  second s e c t o r s  and t h e  rise i n  h e a r t  r a t e  of  t h e  f l y i n g  and n o t  f l y i n g  
p i l o t .  
T i m e  t o  n o t i c e  o i l  c l o g  regressed  on percentage  rise i n  h e a r t  ra te .  
Standard 
c o e f f i c i e n t  
Mean standard r e g r e s s  i o n  T P (2 t a i l )  d e v i a t i o n  
Rise i n  HR, % 9.7 8 .5  -0.410 -1.31 0.22 
Flying o r  n o t  -- - -- - .122 .391  .705 
T i m e  22.5 28.3 
There i s  no c o r r e l a t i o n  of t h e  t i m e  t aken  t o  n o t i c e  t h e  engine o i l  f i l t e r  
c l o g  w i t h  e i t h e r  t h e  r ise  i n  h e a r t  r a t e  over  t h e  lowest p r e f l i g h t  v a l u e  
of t h e  p i l o t s  o r  whether P 1  o r  P2 w a s  t h e  f l y i n g  p i l o t  i n  any p a r t i c u l a r  
second s e c t o r .  
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5. R e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  t i m e  t aken  t o  n o t i c e  t h e  d e p l e t i o n  of No. 3 
D h y d r a u l i c  system and percentage  rise i n  h e a r t  r a t e  of  those  10 P3's who were 
f i rs t  t o  n o t i c e  t h e  o n s e t  of t h e  problem. 
T i m e  t o  n o t i c e  h y d r a u l i c  d e p l e t i o n  r e g r e s s e d  on percentage r ise i n  HR. 
Standard 
c o e f f i c i e n t  
Standard r e g r e s s i o n  T P (2 t a i l )  
Mean d e v i a t i o n  P3's 
R i s e  i n  HR, % 9.5 6.9 0.279 0.82 0.44 
T i m e  28.9 28.7 
Thus, t h e  h e a r t  ra te  of t h e s e  p i l o t s  w a s  n o t  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e i r  v i g i -  
l a n c e  f o r  t h i s  problem. 
6. R e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  h e a r t  r a t e  of  t h o s e  P3's who s a w  t h e  hydrau- 
l i c  problem f i r s t  and t h o s e  who d i d  n o t .  
T Standard d e v i a t i o n  Mean P3's 
Saw 9.5 7.0 
Did n o t  see 13.6 7.7 
1.20 
7. R e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  number of e r r o r s  made i n  f i r s t  and second 
s e c t o r s  and t h e  percentage  r ise i n  h e a r t  ra te  over  r e s t i n g  levels  of P1, P2, 
and P3, c o l l e c t i v e l y  and i n d i v i d u a l l y .  
T o t a l  e r r o r  f o r  s e c t o r  r e g r e s s e d  on percentage  r ise of h e a r t  ra te  f o r  
per iod  p r i o r  t o  c logging  of o i l  f i l e r .  
Standard 
c o e f f i c i e n t  
Mean Standard r e g r e s s i o n  T P (2 t a i l )  d e v i a t i o n  
Sec tor  1 
Mean r i se  i n  HR of  
E r r o r s  7.0 4.4 
P1 + P2 + P3, % 17.7 5.6 -0.142 -0.574 0.574 
Sector  2 
Before o i l  c l o g  
Mean rise i n  HR of  
P1 + P2 + P3, % 11.5 4.6 
E r r o r s  18.2 6.2 
A f t e r  o i l  c l o g  
Mean r ise iq HR of 
P1 + P2 + P3, % 15.4 5.6 
E r r o r s  18.2 6.2 
.026 .lo6 .917 
.199 .812 .429 
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Standard 
Mean Standard r e g r e s s i o n  T P (2 t a i l )  d e v i a t i o n  
c o e f f i c i e n t  - 
Sec to r  1 
R i s e  i n  HR, % 
Erro r  
Sec to r  2 
Before o i l  c l o g  
R i s e  i n  HR, % 
E r r o r  
A f t e r  o i l  c l o g  
R i s e  i n  HR, % 
E r r  o r  
Sec to r  1 
Rise i n  HR, % 
Erro r  
Sec to r  2 
Before o i l  c l o g  
R i s e  i n  HR, % 
Error 
Af te r  o i l  c l o g  
R i s e  i n  HR, % 
E r r o r  
Sec to r  1 
R i s e  i n  HR, % 
E r r o r  
Sec to r  2 
19.7 11.8 -0.136 -0.549 0.591 
7 .0  4.4 
11.3 9.4 -. 360 -1.541 .143 
18.2 6.2 
14.6 10 .4  -. 192 .781  f445 
18.2 6.2 
22.9 9.6 -. 275 -1.146 ,269 
7.0 4.4 
15 .3  11.6 .092 .367 .717 
18.2 6.2 
20.3 13.7 .313 1.316 .206 
18.2 6 .2  
10.5 6 .1  
7.0 4.4 
.302 1.267 .223  
Before o i l  c l o g  
R i s e  i n  HR, % 
Erro r  
7.7 5 .3  
18.2 6.2 




r e g r e s s i o n  T P (2 t a i l )  
c o e f f i c i e n t  
Standard 
d e v i a t i o n  Mean 
P3 (Concluded) 
S e c t o r  2 (Concluded) 
A f t e r  o i l  c l o g  
R i s e  i n  HR, % 11.3 7.4 0.148 0.589 0.566 
E r r o r  18.2 6.2 
The only  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between percentage  r i se  i n  HR and 
e r r o r s  seems t o  b e  f o r  t h e  h e a r t  ra te  of P3's i n  t h e  f i r s t  p a r t  of t h e  second 
s e c t o r s  and t h e  t o t a l  e r r o r s  i n  them. T h i s  may be  caused by t h o s e  P3's who 
showed t h e  h igher  h e a r t  rates as being t h e  ones who were aroused by a s i t u a t i o n  
t h a t  w a s  a l r e a d y  s t r e s s i n g  t h e i r  c a p a c i t y  b e f o r e  t h e  o n s e t  of t h e  increased  
workload due t o  subsequent problems. 
8. R e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  number of e r r o r s  i n  each s e c t o r  of t h e  r u n s  
and t h e  number of  days s i n c e  t h e  c r e w  member's p rev ious  f l i g h t ,  us ing  t h e  sum 
of t h e  days f o r  P1, P2, and P3, as w e l l  a s  i n d i v i d u a l l y .  
A l l  e r r o r s  f o r  f i r s t  and second s e c t o r s  regressed  on sum of days s i n c e  
l a s t  f l i g h t  f o r  P1, P2, and P3. 
Standard 
c o e f f i c i e n t  
T P (2 t a i l )  E r r o r s  r e g r e s s e d  on Standard 
days s i n c e  l a s t  f l i g h t  d e v i a t i o n  Mean r e g r e s s i o n  
S e c t o r  1 
Days 
E r r o r s  
Sec tor  2 
12.1 11.7 0.442 1.97 0.066 
7.0 4.4 
Days 
E r r o r s  
12.1 11.7 .428 1.9 .076 
18.2 6.2 
There i s  a weak r e l a t i o n s h i p  i n  both  t h e  f i r s t  and t h e  second s e c t o r s .  
A l l  e r r o r s  f o r  f i r s t  and second s e c t o r s  regressed  on d a y ' s  l a s t  f l i g h t  
€o r  P1, P2, and P3, i n d i v i d u a l l y .  
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Standard 
r e g r e s s i o n  
c o e f f i c i e n t  
T P (2 t a i l )  Standard 
d e v i a t i o n  
E r r o r s  r e g r e s s e d  on 
days s i n c e  las t  f l i g h t  
Mean 
Sec tor  1 
Days 
E r r o r s  
Sec tor  2 
Days 
E r r o r s  
Sec tor  1 
Days 
E r r o r s  
Sec tor  2 
Days 
E r r  o r  s 
Sec tor  1 
Days 
E r r o r s  
8.8 9.7 
7.0 4.4 
0.495 2.279 0.037 
8.8 9.7 .249 1.030 .318 
18.2 6.2 
13.9 19.7 .140 .568 ,578 
7.0 4.4 
13.9 18.7 .257 1.064 .303 
18.2 6.2 
,076 -13.5  18.9 .429 1.899 
7.0 4.4 
Sec tor  2 
.087 -Days 13.5 18 .9  .415 1.822 
E r r o r s  18.2 6.2 
The r e s u l t s  of t h e s e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  show t h a t  t h e r e  is  a s t r o n g  a s s o c i a t i o n  
between t h e  number of  days s i n c e  t h e  l a s t  f l i g h t  by P l ' s  and t h e  number of 
e r r o r s  t h a t  were recorded f o r  t h e  f i r s t  s e c t o r  t h e y  opera ted .  
There i s  a l s o  a less s t r o n g  a s s o c i a t i o n  between t h e  number of  days s i n c e  
t h e  las t  f l i g h t  of  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  P3 and t h e  number of e r r o r s  seen  i n  both  t h e  
f i r s t  and second s e c t o r s .  
9. R e l a t i o n s h i p  between months f l y i n g  by P1, P2, and P3 i n  t h i s  model 
a i r c r a f t  and t h e  number of e r r o r s  recorded f o r  t h e  f i r s t  and second segments. 
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. Standard 
Mean Standard r e g r e s s i o n  T P (2 t a i l )  
d ev i a  t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  
t 
Sector  1 
t Mean months of 
P1 + P2 + P3 
E r r o r s  
Sec tor  2 
Mean months of 
P1 + P2 + P3 
E r r o r s  
P1 
Sec tor  1 
Mean months 
E r r o r s  
Sec tor  2 
Mean months 
E r r o r s  
Sec tor  1 
Mean months 
E r r o r s  
Sec tor  2 
Mean months 
E r r o r s  
Sec tor  1 
Mean months 
E r r o r s  
Sec tor  2 
30.8 14.7 -0.118 -0.426 0.641 




7.0 4 .4  
33.9 23.6 
18.2 6.2 
27.7 1 8 . 9  
7 .0 4.4 
27.7 18 .9  
18.2 6.2 
52.3 18.7 
7.0 4 .4  
.043 .173 .8 64 
-. 107 -. 429 .674 
.267 1.110 .283 
-. 050 - .202 .843 
-. 266 -1.105 .285 
.203 .831 .418 
Mean months 
E r r o r s  
52.3 18.7 
18.2 6 .2  
-. 109 - .440 .665 
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10. R e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  number of e r r o r s  recorded f o r  t h e  f i r s t  and 
second s e c t o r s  and t h e  mean of  t h e  number of hours  o u t  of bed p r i o r  t o  s t a r t i n g  
t h e  s i m u l a t o r  runs  f o r  P1, P2, and P3. 
T o t a l  e r r o r s  f o r  Sec tor  1 and Sec tor  2 r e g r e s s e d  on hours  o u t  of  bed f o r  
P1 ,  P2, and P3. 
Standard 
c o e f f i c i e n t  
Mean Standard r e g r e s s i o n  T P (2 t a i l )  
d e v i a t i o n  
Sec tor  1 
Mean hours  ou t  of  bed 
E r r o r s  7 .0  4.4  
f o r  P1 + P2 + P3 7.7 4 . 1  -0.075 -0.302 0.766 
Sec tor  2 
Mean hours  o u t  of bed 
E r r o r s  18.2 6.2 
for P1 + P2 + P 3  7 . 7  4 .1  - .320 -1.352 .195 
11. R e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  number of  e r r o r s  recorded f o r  t h e  f i r s t  and 
second s e c t o r s  and t h e  t i m e  of day t h e  crew r e p o r t e d  f o r  t h e  s i m u l a t i o n  run. 
These times were 06.00, 10.15, 15.00, 19.15 h r  and are numbered one t o  f o u r .  
Standard 
c o e f f i c i e n t  
Mean Standard r e g r e s s i o n  T P (2 t a i l )  d e v i a t i o n  
Sec tor  1 
Simulator  s e s s i o n  
E r r o r s  
2.8 1 . 2  -0.161 -0.653 0.523 
7.0 4 . 4  
Sector  2 
Simulat ion s e s s i o n  2.8 1 . 2  -. 251 -1.037 .315 
E r r o r s  18.2 6.2 
12. R e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  t i m e  t aken  t o  d e c i d e  t o  s h u t  down t h e  
engine and t h e  h e a r t  r a t e  taken  20 sec b e f o r e  t h e  d e c i s i o n  expressed as t h e  
percentage  rise over  t h e  lowest  p r e f l i g h t  and whether t h i s  t i m e  w a s  in f luenced  
by P 1  be ing  t h e  " f ly ing"  o r  "nonflying" p i l o t .  
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Standard 
c o e f f i c i e n t  
Mean r e g r e s s i o n  T P (2 t a i l )  Standard d e v i a t i o n  
P1 
Fly ing  o r  n o t  --- --- 0.596 2.566 0.023 
-
Percentage r ise 14 .8  14.2 -. 185 -.799 .439 
Decis ion  t i m e  i n  sec 187.5 66.9 
This  shows a s t r o n g  e f f e c t .  It t a k e s  longer  f o r  t h e  PI. t o  make t h i s  
d e c i s i o n  i f  he i s  t h e  " f l y i n g  p i l o t . "  However, i t  seems t h a t  h e a r t  ra te  i s  
no t  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  d e c i s i o n  t i m e .  
13. R e l a t i o n s h i p  between v i g i l a n c e  and d e c i s i o n  t i m e s  and t h e  number of 
e r r o r s .  
E r r o r s  i n  t h e  second s e c t o r s  regressed  on (1) t i m e  t o  n o t i c e  t h e  o i l  c l o g ,  
(2) t i m e  t o  s h u t  down t h e  engine,  (3) t i m e  t o  d e c i d e  t o  r e t u r n  t o  New York, 
and (4)  t i m e  t o  d e c i d e  t o  dump f u e l .  
Standard 
c o e f f i c i e n t  
Mean r e g r e s s i o n  T P (2 t a i l )  
1. T i m e  t o  n o t i c e  o i l  c l o g  30.12 0.43 1.517 0.157 
2. T i m e  t o  s h u t  down engine 196.3 .29 1.076 .305 
3. T i m e  t o  d e c i d e  t o  r e t u r n  
t o  New York C i t y  250.19 .10 .374 .715 
4 .  T i m e  t o  d e c i d e  t o  dump 403.06 - 0 6  .233 .820 
Mult ip le  "R" 0.5987 
Because of t h e  s m a l l  sample s i z e ,  m u l t i p l e  r e g r e s s i o n  w a s  performed on 
t h e  two most important  v a r i a b l e s .  
E r r o r s  i n  second s e c t o r s  r e g r e s s e d  on (1) t i m e  t o  n o t i c e  t h e  o i l  c l o g  and 
( 2 )  t i m e  t o  s h u t  down t h e  engine.  
Standard 
c o e f f i c i e n t  
Mean r e g r e s s i o n  T P (2 t a i l )  
T i m e  t o  n o t i c e  o i l  c log  30.12 0.42 1.812 0.093 
T i m e  t o  s h u t  down engine 196.31 .33 1.434 .175 
M u l t i p l e  "R': 0.59 
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The t i m e  t aken  t o  n o t i c e  t h e  o i l  c l o g  i s  a weakly s i g n i f i c a n t  p r e d i c t i o n  
of t o t a l  e r r o r s  i n  Sec tor  2. The two v a r i a b l e s ,  t i m e  t o  n o t i c e  and t i m e  t o  
shu t  down, e x p l a i n  about one-third of t h e  v a r i a n c e .  
E r r o r s  i n  second s e c t o r s  regressed  on t h e  number of e r r o r s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  
s e c t o r s  t h a t  preceded them. 
T P ( 2  t a i l )  Standard 
c o e f f i c i e n t  Mean F i r s t  Sec tor  
E r r o r s  7.00 0.208 0.849 0 .408 
This  is  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t .  
p r e d i c t  t h e  e r r o r s  i n  t h e  second s e c t o r .  
Thus, e r r o r s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  s e c t o r  of a r u n  do n o t  
RESULTS 
There w a s  always a s t r o n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between increased  h e a r t  ra te  (HR) 
and be ing  t h e  "f lying" p i l o t  a t  a l l  s t a g e s  of f l i g h t .  There w a s  no r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p  between age and h e a r t  ra te  i n  e i t h e r  t h e  less s t r e s s e d  p r e f l i g h t  condi- 
t i o n  o r  dur ing  landings  which showed t h e  l a r g e s t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  h e a r t  ra te .  
No e f f e c t  w a s  seen between t h e  t i m e  t aken  t o  n o t i c e  t h e  engine o i l  pres-  
s u r e  problem and t h e  h e a r t  r a t e  of t h e  crew i n  t h e  immediately preceding 
per iod .  
The 1 0  P 3 ' s  who n o t i c e d  t h e  d e p l e t i o n  of t h e  h y d r a u l i c  f l u i d  b e f o r e  t h e  
Pl's o r  P2's d i d  n o t  have a s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  HR compared 
w i t h  t h e  8 who d i d  n o t .  
The rise i n  HR of t h e  P3's dur ing  t h e  e a r l y  p a r t  of t h e  second s e c t o r  
w a s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  increased  e r r o r  ra te  f o r  t h o s e  s e c t o r s ,  bu t  no o t h e r  
a s s o c i a t i o n  between HR and e r r o r s  w a s  found. 
The number of e r r o r s  made i n  t h e  f i r s t  s e c t o r s  seemed a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  
number of days s i n c e  Pl's had flown b u t  no t  f o r  second s e c t o r s .  There w a s  
a l s o  a less s t r o n g  a s s o c i a t i o n  between t h e  e r r o r s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  and second 
segments and t h e  number of days s i n c e  t h e  P3's last  f l i g h t .  
There w a s  no r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  number of months t h e  crew members 
had been f l y i n g  t h i s  type  of a i r c r a f t ,  nor  t h e  number of hours  o u t  of  bed 
p r i o r  t o  commencing t h e  s i m u l a t o r  runs ,  nor  w i t h  t h e  t i m e  of day t h e  run  began. 
A r e l a t i o n s h i p  w a s  shown between whether t h e  P1 w a s  t h e  " f ly ing"  p i l o t  o r  
t h e  "nonflying" p i l o t  and t h e  t i m e  t aken  t o  make t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  s h u t  down 
t h e  engine.  
The number of e r r o r s  i n  t h e  low workload s e c t o r  d i d  n o t  p r e d i c t  t h e  number 
of e r r o r s  i n  t h e  fol lowing high workload s e c t o r ;  t h e y  a r e ,  however, weakly 
p r e d i c t e d  by t h e  v i g i l a n c e  measure of t i m e  t o  n o t i c e  t h e  clogged o i l  f i l t e r .  
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This  f i n d i n g  c o n t r a s t s  w i th  t h e  l a c k  of e f f e c t  of a r o u s a l  as i n d i c a t e d  by t h e  
1 r i se  i n  h e a r t  ra te  of P 1  and P2 on t h e  number of e r r o r s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  runs .  
Although t h e  h e a r t  r a t e  of t h e  P 3 ' s  i s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  number of e r r o r s  i n  
I t h e  second s e c t o r s ,  i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  behav io ra l  measure of v i g i l a n c e  
seems t o  be a b e t t e r  o v e r a l l  p r e d i c t o r  of e r r o r s  than  is  h e a r t  ra te .  
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